

Introduction

In 2014, exactly a century after Ludwig Wittgenstein arrived in Cracow, where he would begin writing the first of his surviving philosophical notebooks and had planned to meet the poet Georg Trakl, an international conference was organized at the Jesuit University Ignatianum there, with the aim of exploring the implications of his thought for our understanding of human culture. Wittgenstein, without a doubt, remains controversial throughout the philosophical world even now, and the fact that this status has tended to attach itself to him primarily on account of his strikingly original approaches to topics pertaining to logic, language and the philosophy of mathematics, has probably served to obscure the extent to which he was in fact a thinker seriously, if not centrally, engaged with what one might loosely and provisionally call the phenomenon of 'human culture' – on a number of levels and quite possibly also in a number of distinct but related senses of this term. With this situation in mind, the present volume has selected eight contributions from the abovementioned conference, as a basis for articles that all in their own way seem to have something interesting, new and important to say about this dimension of the Austrian philosopher's intellectual achievement.

Treating Wittgenstein as a philosopher concerned with culture-related issues raises a number of issues that merit mention here, and some sort of awareness of these may serve as a useful frame for readers, at least when they initially encounter the diversity of approaches represented in these pages.

On the one hand, one must decide where one stands on the thorny issue of the relative importance attached to different primary source texts, given the fact that Wittgenstein published so little during his lifetime, and the fact that our access to, and grasp of the genetic significance of various manuscripts, notes, etc., has been in a state of continuous development ever since his death. On the other, one must distinguish the multiple senses in which the concept of 'culture' can be thought of, at least in *prima facie* terms, as figuring significantly in his work. Surveying the latter, at least three broad areas for (or lines of) possible interpretation come to mind.

Firstly, the particular strain of intense ethical engagement running throughout not only Wittgenstein's *thought* in its different phases, but also his *life*, inevitably points us in the direction of interpreting his engagement with human culture as being primarily a concern with whatever it is about human life that furnishes the site for the manifesting – and with this, the sustaining – of our most deeply held attitudes and/or values. The relevance of this to a broader understanding of the philosopher has been thrown into relief by the shift that has undoubtedly taken place in the reception of his thought over the last twenty years or so, away from seeing him as a thinker somehow for the most

part embedded – however uncomfortably – in the predominantly (but not exclusively) Anglo-American tradition of 20th-century language-centred analytical philosophizing.¹

Secondly, the notion of ‘*a* culture’ assumes a complex and potentially contested significance in the context of Wittgenstein’s middle and later periods, due to the extent to which it intersects with central themes in his work relating to language (and through-or-alongside this to logic, mathematics, etc.), especially given the importance of the concepts of ‘language game’, ‘form of life’, ‘perspicuous representation’, and so on – concepts whose own role in his thinking actually remains deeply contested, however familiar they might appear to us now. Wittgenstein’s various and scattered endorsements of a new and distinctive ‘method’ for the resolution of philosophical problems also throws the spotlight on questions about what cultural settings are, as it leads to a concern with imagined or counterfactual scenarios, practices, and other contexts, alongside what is sometimes construed as a perspective on language and value closer to anthropological modes of inquiry than to traditional philosophical ones.

Thirdly, there is a growing body of commentary that attaches more than a secondary significance to the idea that what ultimately motivated Wittgenstein, even in his engagement with what might loosely and crudely be termed ‘mainstream issues of philosophical analysis’, was a desire to formulate a critical response to the specific challenges posed, in his eyes, by the distinctively modern *historical-cultural* situation in which he found himself. Here we encounter issues relating to cultural authenticity and decay, the value of tradition, the distinctive character of religious convictions, and the whole problematic of how, if at all, one should respond as an individual when what was previously implicitly available as a context for living an intrinsically meaningful life has, in some way or other, been called into question.

The questions raised here are, moreover, closely intertwined in Wittgenstein’s thinking about cultural matters with those internal to the other two lines mentioned. For instance, our concerns for our own cultural situation partly find their articulation in our seeing how *that* culture fails to do justice, in the way that a proper cultural anthropology *would* do, to other cultures and their forms of life (Frazer). Meanwhile, reflections on how religious beliefs can function holistically to sustain their own form of culture-specific certainty as expressions of an underlying attitude to life turn out, at least for the Wittgenstein of *On Certainty*, to be not so far removed from what is involved in the broader set of relations of dependency or interdependency obtaining between what we

¹ The so-called ‘ethical turn’ in readings of the *Tractatus*, and the development of a number of radically quietistic therapeutic readings associated with the so-called (and much debated) “New Wittgenstein” approach (associated with the likes of Diamond and Conant), as well as the influential reading of the *Investigations* developed by Stanley Cavell, have undoubtedly contributed significantly to this, but so also have several other currents in recent and contemporary Wittgenstein reception. The field is vast, but one might single out here as particularly interesting not just those who seek to connect Wittgenstein to particular historico-cultural phenomena (e.g. German romanticism, modernism, European musical culture, etc.), but also those who, by stepping back from the details of specific areas of philosophical concern addressed by him in his writings, seem to have succeeded in uncovering there some overall vision of human spiritual aspiration or authentic engagement, in which cultural phenomena are taken to play a defining role. (However one evaluates their work, in this last regard Yuval Lurie and Kevin M. Cahill are perhaps the two names that spring most forcefully to mind.)

are unquestioningly committed to believing to be the case on an everyday basis, and how we act or respond in relation to our surroundings as we seek to carry on with our lives.

Given the intensity and scale of the research conducted into Wittgenstein's achievement and oeuvre over recent decades, it is rare now for a commentator to be able to claim to have made a ground-breaking discovery about what the philosopher really intended, based on the unearthing of new textual data. However, this is, in effect, what Susan Edwards-McKie offers us in her article "Wittgenstein's Wager: Mathematics, Culture and Human Action". Edwards-McKie critically considers the typical reasons for thinking of Wittgenstein as a cultural conservative of sorts, before appealing to some intricately detailed textual considerations pertaining to his evolving thinking about mathematics (and its relation to issues of finitism, constructivism, and rule-following) to argue that in fact there is a significant sense in which he was, after all, making a far-reaching contribution to a modernist discourse of human open-endedness.

Next, in "Theistic and Atheistic Picture-Metaphors in Our Culture: Wittgensteinian Inspirations", Jakub Gomułka explores rationality from a perspective inspired by Wittgenstein (together with his pupil Rush Rhees, and Simone Weil), and with specific reference to its role in religious debates between theists and atheists, and to the pluralistic, culture-specific conception of 'rationality' (and its criteria) associated with Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of a 'tradition of inquiry'. The author claims that every sense of the term 'rationality' is grounded in a prelinguistic, fundamental 'picture-metaphor', which acts as a basic framework for systematising knowledge. He then proposes that we should regard theistic and atheistic traditions as based on two generally different sorts, or families, of such pictures (the former hierarchically organized around an absolute point of reference, the latter 'horizontal'). For Gomułka, philosophical traditions of inquiry vary not only in respect of their differing accounts of the world, but also as regards their self-understanding, and how they construe their relations to other traditions. This allows him to acknowledge – albeit from a pluralist standpoint – that even fundamentalist traditions can claim to possess rationality, though this will of course be a rationality determined exclusively by their own strictly internal criteria.

Carl Humphries, in "Wittgenstein, Culture and Forms of Life", begins by exploring the issue of how much importance we should invest in different texts by Wittgenstein when seeking to determine the thrust of his thinking about culture-related matters. He contrasts those who argue for strictly limiting oneself to 'core' texts (or parts of texts) known to have been judged ready for publication by Wittgenstein, with those who regard all of his writings as potentially equally revealing of where he stood. Humphries then proposes a middle course, from which two distinct kinds of position on cultural matters emerge as attributable to the Austrian thinker. A 'soft' position inclines towards a pluralistic relativism, wherein the distinct evaluative perspectives sustained by different cultures, historical contexts and individuals are held to be incommensurable, while a 'hard' position commits him to cross-cultural or supra-perspectival judgements of an evaluative kind. Humphries seeks to clarify the relation between these by viewing them

in the light of relevant key themes from the philosopher's more central texts. Yet he finds that on a reading that takes the notion of 'forms of life' as basic, the *Investigations* also leaves significant room for both sorts of position. A consideration of how various readings of *On Certainty* might deliver differing stances as regards their relative importance then leads him to conclude that their coexistence is made most intelligible in the context of a 'diachronic' reading – one that stresses connections between pluralism and the thought that differences of cultural perspective (expressed at the level of 'bedrock', etc.) may turn out to correspond to differences of temporal standpoint vis a vis events.

Following on from this, in "Leading a Meaningful Life in an Age of Crisis: The Ethical Implications of Wittgenstein's 1930 Sketches 'For a Foreword'", Andreas Koritensky focuses on one of the most striking sets of remarks concerning cultural matters to be found in the entire Wittgenstein corpus, which date from a crucial phase in the philosopher's transition towards his later approach and are imbued with both a highly personal and an intensely philosophical dimension. Koritensky sees Wittgenstein as pursuing here a similar ideal of philosophy to that of the ancients, for whom it was "not only the discourse of theoretical and of practical reason, in the sense of understanding the world and identifying the right way of life, but also the exercising of a certain form of life". At the same time, according to this author, Wittgenstein saw both philosophy and its social and intellectual contexts as having changed in a way that now precluded that ancient synthesis, leading to a separation of these tasks which he himself experienced as a profound state of cultural crisis. Koritensky takes this to shed light on the later Wittgenstein's critical stance towards philosophy itself, and he explores in depth the way in which Wittgenstein can be understood as simultaneously seeking to make sense of classical ethical questions while at the same time attempting to live the right sort of life, either by re-entering the Christian tradition or by embracing a sober-minded alternative that itself possesses a philosophical character.

In his article, Markus Lipowicz emphasizes the thesis that in Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, and especially in the context of the development of his later work, we may encounter a substantial alternative to the Nietzschean project of transgressing the limits of humanity, together with its contemporary consequences as embodied in the slogan "the death of man". In fundamental opposition to this strategy of dehumanization, Wittgenstein pursues an almost paradoxical connection between the return of the human personality to its most immanent source on the one hand, and self-transcendence on the other. This connection is grounded in Wittgenstein's early concept of "the mystical", but is continuously deepened in his later work, especially with the view of culture conveyed in his criticisms of Frazer's "The Golden Bough" and his defence of the original content and worth of rituals and expressive acts as witnessed paradigmatically in "primitive" cultures.

Walter Schweidler, in "Wittgenstein, Goethe, and the Metonymic Principle", explores the proximity of Wittgenstein's thoughts to Goethean motives. More particularly, he explores the parallels between Goethe's and the later Wittgenstein's respective rejections of those conceptions of the relationship between language and reality that

would prompt one to always seek to look behind phenomena in the hope of uncovering some sort of basis for a causal-theoretical explanation of how language gives us access to the world. For Schweidler, the key to understanding what is at stake here lies in the thought that language ‘touches’ reality in the sort of way captured when we think of the former as standing in a metonymic relation to the latter, rather than in relations of isomorphism or similarity such as are standardly implied by a correspondence-based conception of truth. Goethe’s notion of ‘*Urphänomen*’ and Wittgenstein’s ideas concerning ‘language games’ and ‘forms of life’ provide key points of reference here. Apart from establishing just how deep the threads of continuity are that run between these two culturally iconic figures, Schweidler’s comparative approach presents what is arguably one of the most important reasons for thinking of Wittgenstein as a thinker centrally concerned with cultural matters. This concerns the sense in which it is ‘culture’ (in the sense of *this or that* culture, but also construed in terms of the forms of life that furnish the bedrock limits to what is subject to justificatory epistemic demands) that is the irreducible site of what the author refers to as “the coincidence between phenomenon and reality in our linguistic access to reality”. The crucial insight opened up by this is that this coincidence, providing that it is construed according to the metonymic conception outlined here, need not imply a relativization of our access to reality, even when the “unjustifiability of our everyday use of our language” has been as comprehensibly acknowledged as we find it to be in the thinking of the later Wittgenstein.

After this, in “‘A Perspicuous Representation’: Ritual Practice and the Human Body in Wittgenstein”, Chryssi Sidiropoulou addresses two issues that arise in the context of Wittgenstein’s *Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough*. The first of these is Frazer’s presumption to the effect that ritual is essentially a reflection of faulty beliefs, and thus manifests a kind of primitive form of theoretical engagement. The second is his failure, from Wittgenstein’s point of view, to properly acknowledge the distinction between causes and reasons as this applies not just to our understanding of ritual but also to the social sciences generally. In the latter case, Sidiropoulou brings out the point that, for Wittgenstein, there is a similar problem with assuming that it makes sense to embark on an empirical-causal investigation into the historical genesis of something like ritual. The operative contrast here is with a more ‘reflective’ mode of investigation, grounded in the recognition that for one to be struck by such a historical phenomenon as one is is to already be in some sort of state of exposure to commonalities of response linking one’s own cultural perspective to that of the supposedly ‘primitive’ people under consideration. Finally, pursuing further this same theme of commonality, the author lays stress on a feature that is without doubt under-discussed in the literature to date: the significance that the embodied character of human beings takes on in the light of Wittgenstein’s later approach to issues associated with the philosophy of mind.

The final article in this volume, which comes from the pen of Ireneusz Ziemiński, is entitled “Wittgenstein on Eternal Life”. The author sets out to answer the question of what, for Wittgenstein, it meant to live, so to speak, *eternally*. The point of departure here is, quite naturally, *Tractatus* 6.4311 (“If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the pre-

sent”). Ziemiński’s exploration falls into three stages: first he sketches the contours of Wittgenstein’s critical stance towards a belief in realistic forms of eternal life, then he fleshes out the idea of living in a present from which death is excluded, and finally, he investigates and seeks to defuse (where possible) the apparent problems associated with construing eternal life as life in the present. It transpires that for Wittgenstein, eternal life was to be thought of as a form of earthly life itself, rather than as some form of afterlife – one focused on a non-transient present, from the perspective of which there would be no experience of the passage of time leading towards death. What comes out of this, on Ziemiński’s reading of the author of the *Tractatus*, is a scenario in which “there is no difference in opinion regarding facts between a person who believes in eternal life and a person who does not; they simply have different attitudes towards the world”. That links up tellingly with some other relatively recent approaches that have found inspiration in the later Wittgenstein’s distinctive way of articulating the relation between factuality per se on the one hand, and non-factually-grounded attitudes on the other – especially as this pertains to concerns of an ethico-religious or ethico-spiritual nature. (The work of David Cockburn springs most readily to mind here as a point of comparison in this respect.) Having already been exposed to the substance and diversity of the interpretations exhibited in the preceding articles presented here, we trust that readers will be comparatively well positioned to determine for themselves the implications of Ziemiński’s conclusion for any truly serious understanding of Wittgenstein’s engagement with cultural or culture-related matters.

The various aspects of the topos of culture in Wittgenstein’s work highlighted in the contributions to this volume enable us to broaden and diversify our perspectives not only on his philosophical intentions, but also on his methodology and relevance for contemporary thinking on the subject of culture. At the very least, they serve to demonstrate that the adoption of a one-sided approach to his thinking about language, wherein his more analytical claims and the broader cultural background to his philosophical objectives and concerns are isolated from one another, risks depriving us of some of the most fruitful perspectives on his work. This is true not only in a positive, but also in a critical sense. Indeed, it might even be that these perspectives on Wittgenstein’s approach to culture tell us something about ourselves which even he could not have anticipated.

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Carl Humphries, Walter Schweidler

Wittgenstein's Wager: Mathematics, Culture and Human Action

Susan Edwards-McKie

Abstract

Panofsky's famous 1936 essay on Poussin's painting "Et in Arcadia Ego" is but one reminder of the centrality of the constellation of concepts which, for two millennia, have energised the debates on 'decline' and 'progress'. Building on points made by Panofsky, in the first section I will place Wittgenstein's philosophy of culture within the debate crystallised by Nyiri, von Wright and Janik, arguing that while there are many points of evidence which would align Wittgenstein with a conservatism – Wittgenstein's preference for pre-modernist music and literature, his distrust of 'technicist' solutions, such as those advocated by Russell to world problems, and his more general, somewhat Spenglerian, attitude of being out of touch with the spirit of his times – the relegation of Wittgenstein's Nachlass to a position outside the modernist discourse is an error, leading to a dismissal of the importance of his work in the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of physics.

Secondly, using a recent Nachlass discovery (Edwards-McKie: 2014) concerning the genesis of *Philosophical Investigations* which highlights Wittgenstein's reflections on quantum mechanics, combined with specific MS connections across the Nachlass concerning issues of space and time, and potential and actual infinity, I will construct an argument which shows that the would-be pessimist Wittgenstein offers a characterisation of space and time as that of *unendliche Möglichkeit* of human movement – in contrast to, or at least contradistinction from, a technicist plan for improvement. It is here that the philosopher of culture emerges most strikingly.

1. Introduction

Bringing my work on the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of physics, that aspect of Wittgenstein's work which has occupied me for some time, to the face of other areas of Wittgenstein's philosophical work, is the interchange that I have been asked to explore today. I propose to do this by looking at modernism, from several different angles, as we find our way through several Nachlass discoveries I have made over the past several years. Indeed, these discoveries highlight the considerable interpenetration of Wittgenstein's mathematical constructivist ideas and his cultural constructivist ideas. As an introduction and establishing of bridging concepts between

mathematics and culture, I will draw on an interesting essay by Panofsky (1955),¹ combining this with the interrelated articles by von Wright (1993), Janik (1985) and Nyiri (1982) in their assessment of Wittgenstein's politico-cultural views.

Progress and decline are inevitably the 'buzz words' in discussions of culture, and with Wittgenstein's choice of Nestroy for the introductory quotation to the *Philosophical Investigations* (*Philosophische Untersuchungen*) and many of his remarks in *Culture and Value*, we know that Wittgenstein was greatly concerned with what might be judged to be progress or what might be done in the name of progress. I construct an argument which shows that while eschewing a scientific modernism, we do, at our peril, relegate Wittgenstein to a position which completely removes his contribution from the modernist discourse: his conceptions of space and time, and the potential infinite impact on his conceptions of human movement and indeterminism.

2. Preamble: Arcadia of the Right and Arcadia of the Left

Firstly, I have chosen to mobilise Panofsky's famous essay on Arcadia, "Et in Arcadia Ego", with its structured assessment of progress and decline, because modernism can gain a crisp, clear, impactful interpretation by considering two distinctly different views of Arcadia. Panofsky rightly points out that one of the major divisions within the conceptual history of Arcadia is that which views Arcadia either as a barren land of work and toil or as a land of beauty and plenty, where both views have several variations. The reflective, elegiac treatment of the land of beauty is certainly the more modern, when contrasted with the medieval moralising view, and that which one could align to a form of conservatism, broadly considered, as it has developed since the 18th century. On the other hand, to see Arcadia as the harsh reality that it was is a view which more convincingly aligns with the 'realistic' perception of the hardship of the peasant and working-classes – a plight which requires modernist scientific programmes of progress to ameliorate. One of the key arguments of this essay is that, while Wittgenstein does not endorse scientific materialism, or even bourgeois liberalism with a strong improvement agenda, he also does *not* participate in an elegiac pastoralism so prevalent in an elitism as this class turns away from decaying societies towards the 'purity' of Arcadia.

That by some commentators Wittgenstein has been perceived to be this sort of conservative – e.g. Janik reads Nyiri's paper as, ultimately, a presentation of such a position and in Fania Pascal's recollections, an even more reactionary assessment is voiced: "...he was still an old-time conservative of the late Austrian-Hungarian Empire" (Pascal 1979: 29) – has, I suggest, impacted negatively on the reception of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and contributed to the lack of care given to the unpacking of the complexity of his mathematical position. If one is judged to be a neo-conservative culturally, then the prevailing scientific modernist will have cause to judge the philosophical work of such a political thinker to be at fault also, or so the argument goes. Janik attempts to save Wittgenstein from this fate by arguing that the

¹ Originally published in 1936.

personal man was not the philosophical man, or that what Nyiri purports concerning conservatism could just as readily be attributed to passages of Marx. However, the arguments of both Nyiri and Janik have faults of their own, and von Wright, rejecting Janik's contention, comes closer to the correct understanding of Wittgenstein's cultural and political position as that of authentic speech and action, which cuts across the customary left and right divide and embraces all classes.

I set myself the task of accomplishing a moving argument on two fronts. Firstly, I shall offer some rehabilitation of the Wittgensteinian philosophy of mathematics, which came to be seen as backward-looking, particularly in the mid-thirties with the great acceptance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems and the publication of Turing's 1936 article, "On the Computability of Numbers" (Turing 1936) and his associated work on the *Entscheidungsproblem*. This will be done through an introductory exploration of the Nachlass discovery of the Hidden Revision, a hitherto unknown early revision of the *Philosophical Investigations* which fits the 1938 Vorwort and the Rhees translation.²

In addition, I will look briefly at the associated MS 178e, which I have elsewhere (Edwards-McKie 2015), after Heraclitus, called the Cosmic Fragment, and at the correction of an initial von Wright error, to more effectively understand the Hidden Revision. This important revision highlights quantum mechanical concerns, and sits tightly with the Whewell's Court lectures of the 1938-1940 period. Secondly, as a *consequence* of this rehabilitation, I shall, briefly, provide a window onto Wittgenstein's philosophy of culture as a significant contribution to the modernist discourse.

3. Bridging concepts: Janik, Nyiri and von Wright – wherein lies the philosophical man?

Nyiri's facile insistence on authority as a key feature both of conservatism and Wittgensteinian rule-following, albeit an attempt to temper conservatism by introducing Oakshottian ideas, is rightly objected to by von Wright and Janik as an entry into characterising Wittgensteinian rule-following. I have argued elsewhere (Edwards-McKie 2012, 2015) that the paradox of the simultaneity of the automatic and the guided in constructing a proof as dealt with by Wittgenstein is a key which, when turned, opens a door which allows light on issues which span the choices of mathematical, ontological and ethical paradigms. Looking at the passage in MS 122 of 1939 provides an important explication of rule-following for a variety of cases.

In the 22.1.39 entry of MS 122 Wittgenstein attempts to coax into language the paradoxical nature of the simultaneity of the automatic and the guided when following a rule. Throughout Wittgenstein's work we are reminded of the distinction between experiment and proof, with the related point that it makes no sense to ascribe a causal connection in following a rule. The second variant of this 1939 entry reads: "in every reproduction of a proof the result must be automatically maintained, on the one hand,


² A full exploration of these issues is forthcoming in book form; also included are the concordances of the numberings of the Hidden Revision material and subsequent revisions, as discussed below.

but that it nevertheless also guides, on the other” (my translation). Wittgenstein’s criticism of over-reliance on local causal realist explanations is also present in the Whewell’s Court lectures of 1938-1940, as are his concerns about volition and the human will. As pointed out by Munz, Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s position in many of the lectures “leads Wittgenstein to questions about knowledge and causality” (Munz 2010: 88). In subsequent variants of this MS 122 entry the added “anzuerkennen” brings *recognition* of being guided, understanding the rules of a game as rules, as a condition for the full participation in the various games of a form of life.

Wittgenstein’s critique of Russell’s programme was, among other things, that to fulfil an order on Russell’s analysis left an irreducible opacity between certain events merely coming about which would fulfil that order and following an order with a recognition of doing so. In modern parlance, one might say that the intentionality could not be accounted for in Russell’s system. But one must be very guarded indeed not to naturalise intentionality in Wittgenstein’s way of posing problems of agency. His repeated warnings that we must not characterise thinking as some mysterious mental act or processes in the ‘head’ works in tandem with the argument that following a rule is neither ‘automatic’ nor causally brought about. This is the correct context – not the context of a conservative authority as Nyiri suggests – which frames and focuses the multi-dimensional conception of rule-following. For Wittgenstein, it is a way into the thorny issue of agency.

It should be clear that the issues of agency more generally and the argument advanced thus far impact on Wittgensteinian constructivist mathematics, with constructive proof at its heart. However, Wittgenstein is not a finitist, thus his constructivism has more ‘bite’. In the crucial 1937-39 period for the genesis of the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein returns to his philosophy of mathematics of the earlier Vienna Circle years. Crucial passages from MS 117 refer to TS 213 rather than to TS 221 as von Wright had originally conjectured (Edwards-McKie 2015: 71-74).³ References in MS 117 are clearly to ‘Denke, Denken’, to the heavily emended ‘Grammatik’ and to the earlier years when these concepts sat synergistically amongst ‘Verstehen’ and ‘Grundlagen der Mathematik’. All references in this section of MS 117 point to TS 213, starting at the question “Könnte eine Maschine denken?”

³ See also Hilmy 1987: 25-39 for a discussion of the role of TS 213 in the *Investigations*, information which was subsequently included in the later 1992 von Wright catalogue. I am grateful to Nuno Venturinha 2016 for bringing the Hilmy reference to my attention.



The Cosmic Fragment (MS 178 e)

Thus we need to think of the correction of the initial von Wright error and the placing of the Cosmic Fragment *together* as a means to further our understanding of how issues of thinking, counting, construction and games form a synergy. This MS 178e brings together the conceptions of construction of an infinite series, *Härte des logischen Zwangs*, *unendliche Reihe*, *Maschine als Symbol ihrer Funktion* and his question “Aber sind denn die Übergänge also durch die Algebraische Formel bestimmt?” That the transitions not yet determined in advance are in some sense guided places us again in an area of near-paradox which returns us to our main concern when approaching agency.

In addition, the main set of ideas from the essay *Unendliche Möglichkeit*, which characterises space as not extended, but states that “Der Raum gibt der Wirklichkeit eine unendliche Gelegenheit der Teilung” (TS 215: 19), is to be linked with the freedom of human movement, a connection Wittgenstein made relatively early in his philosophical writings (see TS 208:16). In a peculiar sense, our following a rule blindly means that we have freely agreed to playing a game, which once again focuses on the paradoxical juxtapositioning of *logische Zwangs* and *unendliche Möglichkeit*.

Furthermore, that a student's learning may come to an end and he or she be unable to see that the way in which he/she is acting is not the same as others in the game is a problem which vexed Wittgenstein, but a possibility which he was at pains to preserve (see PI: 143, 144; RFM: 115). These passages should remind us of the argument above: that conservative authority is not the point at issue in rule-following, but that the target is that of an etherish, hidden variable, or as Wittgenstein characterises it in this same essay, a misleading by “ein mythisches Element in die Logik //Grammatik/” (TS 215: 20).

Wittgenstein's remarks on proof, on constructing an infinite series, on counting, on obeying an order all stress their distinction from experiment. Indeed the outcomes of quantum mechanics violate the strictly experimental generalisation of causal realist explanation in science and classically construed probabilities. Such a consideration is supported by work in quantum decision theory in which uncertainty plays a crucial role in the ways in which decisions are made and offers an explanation for divergences from rationalistic utility decision theory.⁴ Putting it more controversially, to follow a rule blindly, which is the main quotation used by Nyiri to support his analysis of Wittgensteinian rule-following, is, instead, a reflection of the quantum mechanical thesis of indeterminacy: that it is impossible to predict, to know in advance, which path the electron will take in the double-slit experiment, this indeterminacy outstripping the parameters of the classically underdetermined scenarios of even distribution, and, furthermore, that there is no hidden variable explanation which can create the determinacy sought by the causal realist. Rather, the rules provide us with the *opportunity* to constitute meaning, the opportunity for infinite division, the opportunity for movement.

4. The Third Way

Wittgenstein is a constructivist but not a finitist, as is clearly evidenced in his dismissal of the resolute finitist Alice Ambrose from the inner circle of Cambridge students, and in his criticism of both behaviourism and finitism in his notebooks. However, these two positions are rarely sufficiently distinguished in the research literature. For example, Marion does not distinguish them, and argues that Wittgenstein is a finitist in mathematics (Marion 2008), while both the Edinburgh School of Sociology and Kusch at Vienna place Wittgenstein within the finitist camp as regards meaning, on the grounds that, in contrast to the deterministic school, extensions of concept words are not determined in advance. While this may be a necessary condition for finitism, it certainly is not a sufficient one.

Janik rightly criticises Nyiri's overly deterministic interpretation of rule-following, which Nyiri attributes to Wittgenstein, a criticism in which von Wright concurs. However, von Wright's criticism of Janik in respect of his failing to appreciate that man and philosophy are interconnected exposes the positive feature which is essential to understanding Wittgenstein and aspects of Viennese modernism – indeed it appears earlier in the Grillparzer play of which Wittgenstein was particularly fond, one which received censorship because it neither supported the Hapsburgs unconditionally nor pleased the rising tide of scientific rationalism. This literary evidence resurfaces in another of the Nachlass discoveries of which I will speak in a moment. Firstly, I want to look just a bit further at rule-following.


MS 157a, the first section dated 4.6.34, combines discussions of the *Diagonal-methode*, *Sprachspiel*, with many passages concerning generality and the following of a rule. Yet in this section we are warned of being misled by the idea of "*des Begreifens*

⁴ See Edwards-McKie, "The uncertainty principle: what is wrong and what is right in the standard view of quantum decision theory for the ameliorisation of cultures after war" (Vienna: forthcoming).

des Systems” (MS157a: 37, verso), if it should lead us into the error of imaging that there is a prior mental mechanistic grasp of a whole system before one can begin. This distinction is crucial in picking up on the reasons for Wittgenstein’s use of action at a distance in the *Nachlass* discovery of the Hidden Revision, to which I shall now turn.⁵

5. The Hidden Revision of 1938-1939 and what this tells us

When reading TS 239 I became aware that there was an earlier numbering of the remarks which had been partially erased. After several months of close examination I was able to reconstruct this numbering by careful study of TSS 239, 238 and 237. It forms a virtually unblemished continuation of consecutive numbering which fits seamlessly onto the first numbering visible in TS 222. Thus we have remarks 1-192 established as the Hidden Revision of TS 220 and remarks 193-316 established as a continuation not merely in pagination but in remark numbering of the reconstructed TS 221 from the clippings of TS 222.



Erased numberings of the Hidden Revision of PU 1938; enhanced, filtered image copyright S. Edwards-McKie


It is well known that there were several attempts to unite TSS 220 and 221 as several emendations to the numbering system were made, and it is a delicate task to chart each of these stages. However, we have hitherto been unaware of this early revision, pre-cut, its numbering fitting exactly the numbering of Rhees’ translation, TS 226.

While the often-expressed suggestion that MS 116 formed the collection of remarks envisaged to be placed in some form with the 1938 *Philosophische Bemerkungen* as projected to Cambridge University Press has merit, we have little evidence about any form that this would have taken, nor were we aware of this earlier revision and the interesting points which it raises. I am inclined to believe that MS 116, if envisaged as the source for the cross-referenced remarks, was abandoned at this point. I have argued elsewhere that concerns with phenomenology and grammar were

⁵ There are historically, and continue to be, varying scholarly positions within the debate concerning the genesis of the *Investigations*, with my own findings broadly supporting some form of an early joining of TSS 220 and 221. See Baker and Hacker 2005; Edwards-McKie 2013, 2014, 2015; McGuinness 2001; Nedo 1998; Pichler 1994, 2004; Rothhaupt 2010a & b, 2011; Schulte 2001; Venturinha 2010; von Wright 1979. I wish to thank Brian McGuinness, Alois Pichler and Josef Rothhaupt for conversations on this issue.

shifting, and as such some of the remarks of the first section of MS 116 would not have held the same applicability in this period as Wittgenstein's work conclusively progressed into explorations of a developing philosophy of mathematics. TS 213 is a large and shifting document, with the criteria of selection into MS 116 and selections and hand-written additions with their internal relations to the composition of MS 117, which is the nexus of TS 221, a significant guide to the complexity of the 1937-1939 period.

What we should note is that the series of numerous remarks which Wittgenstein did choose to mark out at this point in the associated typescripts by extra numbers form a group of ideas which have a coherence concerning action at a distance and how he approached it through the concept of application of a rule. There are also the supporting philosophical issues of how the finite and the infinite are related, about pieces in a game and words in a language – all tightly clustered together in considerations concerned with the application and following of rules. These cross-referenced remarks are concerned with logical compulsion, with divisibility of a group and how this relates to seeing aspects (a connection to which many of the proofs in the conjugate MSS attest), with the importance of not thinking in terms of the *essence* of a form when considering the possibilities of division, hedged with the *deep* need for convention.



TS 222: marked passages, as example

To understand what this early concatenation of ideas signals places us in a stronger position to attempt to decipher the subsequent re-numberings in Wittgenstein's repeated attempts to weld together TS 220 and TS 221. We are once again balancing between opposites, this time between the denial of morphological necessity and the denial of an easy, surface conventionalism.

Action at a distance and issues about time and infinity are also addressed in the Whewell's Court lectures of the same time, which Wittgenstein gave in 1938-1940, while the pocket notebook 157a, begun earlier but returned to in 1937, has a section which addresses "Wirkung in die Ferne" (157a: 9-11). All of the issues we have considered in this essay have been active in this same time period: the crux of the *Investi-*