

Preface

John Glucker was born in 1933 in British Mandate Haifa to a father from Vienna and a mother from the border region between Poland and the Soviet Union. A catalyst to critical thinking came in the form of at least one of his school teachers, Baruch Kurtzweil, later appointed professor of literature at Bar Ilan University. John was blessed with additional outstanding teachers such as Chaim Wirszubski, Jacob Fleischmann, Shlomo Pines, and Alexander Fuks, at the Hebrew University, where he studied Philosophy, Classics, and History (1954-60). John's English phase began with three years at Oxford, studying with, among others, Gwil Owen and Hugh Lloyd-Jones (1960-63), before he was snatched away by the Department of Classics at the University of Exeter (1963-78). It was there that he researched and wrote his *magnum opus*, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, published in 1978. It was also in 1978 that he accepted a position in the Department of Classics in Tel Aviv University where he remained until his retirement in 2001, the year in which the University of Athens (Greece) awarded him the degree of *doctor philosophiae honoris causa*, for his services to Greek culture. In 2002, he was given a deservedly glowing encomium by Prof. Israel Shatzman of the Hebrew University in *Scripta Israelica Classica XXI*, 1-2, the periodical of the Israel Society for the Promotion of Classical Studies of which John had on separate occasions been Secretary and President. The years since his retirement have been occupied with research, part-time teaching in Greece, and in particular his editing of *Katharsis*, about which a few words are in order.

Those who know John will be aware of his Peripatetic tendencies. The Stoic view that the healthy soul is the only Good appears to him somewhat ingenuous. He agrees with Cicero's preference for the Peripatetic position that bodily and external goods enable the spiritually good man to live well, while bodily and external evils are an obstruction to a completely good life. John has clearly flourished as a good man with the external goods conducive to his research, while recent ill health has adversely affected his happiness and extraordinary output, albeit to an astonishingly small degree. Despite these Peripatetic tendencies, however, it would be a mistake to regard John as a Peripatetic through and through.

John, with his richly diverse upbringing, and imbued with the writings of Cicero from his student days, is very much a Ciceronian Academic. He, like Cicero and earlier skeptical Academics, habitually ranges a formidable array of arguments and positions on two or more sides of a problem in order to arrive at

profound, albeit provisional, conclusions, which he applies consistently until new evidence suggests a different approach. Thus it is as an Academic, with the habit of arguing *in utramque partem* with a thorough knowledge of the particulars, that John prefers, provisionally, Peripatetic to Stoic ethics.

It is also as a true Academic that John conducts his research. Academic methodology requires mastering all the tools of the trade, examining each particular case from all sides, and painstakingly arriving with meticulous care at the most plausible, but not dogmatic, conclusion. His Academic criticism of scholars failing to execute their research in a similar way was noted in the encomium mentioned above: “John is a staunch and vigorous defender of scholarly standards and has not hesitated to castigate openly colleagues who, in his opinion, were negligent in their writings.” John’s practice was remarkable at a time when there was no Hebrew periodical dedicated to reviewing scholarly literature in the humanities. His retirement in 2001 provided John with the opportunity to set up and edit the Hebrew review periodical *Katharsis*, which he has continued to edit to this day. Papers published there focus on methodological issues arising from the material reviewed, be the criticisms positive or negative. Those reviewed are encouraged to respond, thus promoting the spirit of academic debate which had become noticeably absent in recent years. It is a mark of John’s integrity that he has continued publishing issues – twenty-six to date since 2004 – despite great pressure from on high to desist, or to publish the more acceptable sort of reviews that merely praise or say nothing. His success may be measured in the increasing number of serious reviews published in *Katharsis* written by academics from all fields of the humanities and social sciences.

John is a man of many letters and tongues. He is at home in the literatures of the three Classical languages, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, from ancient times all the way to their modern manifestations, and he is intimate with a great deal of early-modern and modern European literature besides. His breadth and depth of knowledge is encountered at every turn in his extensive research on both the ancient world and the history of the scholarly tradition. This being the case, justice cannot be done to all sides of the man in one volume, and we have confined ourselves to just the ethical aspect of John’s work and character, with twenty contributions ranging over the whole field of Greek philosophy, from its beginnings to the early modern period.

Konstantine Boudouris (University of Athens) argues that “every education is primarily an education in virtue”, and pays particular attention to the ethics of Plato and Aristotle. Plato receives further attention in the form of three studies on individual dialogues: **Voula Tsouna** (University of California, Santa Barbara) emphasizes how the analysis itself of *Charmides* necessarily contributes to one’s own development of temperance (the overt subject of the dialogue); **Yosef Liebersohn** (Bar Ilan University) concentrates on the least analysed of the three conversations in *Gorgias*, and determines that Plato’s

Polus is intended to represent the typical citizen in a democratic regime, with all that that entails in the context of rhetoric and ethics; **Ivor Ludlam** (University of Haifa) analyses *Hippias Minor* and compares his conclusions with the conclusions of his earlier analysis of *Hippias Major*, demonstrating how such comparison between dialogues may lead to a new understanding of Plato's ethical thought, and of development in that thought.

Aristotle's ethics also come under further scrutiny. **Jaap Mansfeld** (Utrecht University) observes that Aristotle's references to his predecessors differ according to the length (and hence status) of the tradition of each branch of philosophy, physics being the longest, dialectic the shortest, and ethics somewhere in between; **William Fortenbaugh** (Rutgers University) considers the problematic so-called "questionable mean-dispositions", treated variously in the three Aristotelian ethical treatises; **Dorothea Frede** (University of California, Berkeley) weighs up the pros and cons of Aristotle's virtue-based ethics, resulting in what looks very much like an Academic suspension of judgement.

And so to the tangled web of Hellenistic schools: **Keimpe Algra** (Utrecht University) reassesses the evidence adduced in support of an argument that Stoic physics derives in part from a dogmatic Academic source; **Tomohiko Kondo** (Hokkaido University) looks at the use to which Plato's dialogues were put in the ethical disputations between Stoics and Academics; **Anna Maria Ioppolo** (University of Rome) asks whether the Academic Clitomachus misrepresented his master Carneades on the meaning of "following the 'probable'".

Cicero may not be the only one to think that philosophy declined in the Hellenistic period; but, according to **Woldemar Görler** (University of Saarland), it was his particular ambition to hand down to his successors an improved, Romanized, philosophy; **Harold Tarrant** (University of Newcastle, Australia) discovers Seneca repurposing an anti-sceptical source found in Epicurus; **Jan Opsomer** (Catholic University of Louvain) intriguingly fleshes out the first century CE Platonist Ofellius Laetus; **John Dillon** (Trinity College Dublin) explores the multifacetedness of Plutarch's Platonism which extends to both the dogmatic and the sceptical phases of the Academy; **Andrew Smith** (University College Dublin) looks at a burning issue in Plotinus, namely the analogy of fire and heat; coming full circle, **André Laks** (University of Paris-Sorbonne) raises new questions about Diogenes Laertius and his use of sources for his prologue on the origins of philosophy.

On the history of the tradition of Greek philosophy in modern times, **Jill Kraye** (University of London) traces the development of attitudes towards Stoicism, from the Renaissance fascination with Roman Stoics to the rediscovery in the eighteenth century of the earlier Greek Stoics; **Amos Edelheit** (Maynooth University) examines the redivision of Aristotelian philosophy by the fifteenth century Nicoletto Vernia; **Tiziano Dorandi** (Jean Pépin Centre, French National Centre for Scientific Research) presents a section of Politian's

lectures on Aristotle and Porphyry, and throws light on Politian's *modus operandi*; **Malcolm Schofield** (Cambridge University) argues that the two Platos of Victorian Britain (Grube's utilitarian and Jowett's idealist Plato contrasted in John Glucker's 1996 article) have in common an atomist approach to the dialogues and a strong belief in the historian's obligation to give Plato his place in history, while at the same time looking for modern applications of what was best in Plato's political thought, particularly in the sphere of education.

Many friends and admirers who would have liked to contribute to this volume have had to be excluded due to its limited scope, but they join us in celebrating an exceptional man: a *tabula gratulatoria* may be found at the end of the volume. We append to this introduction a bibliography as full as we have been able to make it of John's works.

A Bibliography of the Works of John Glucker

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Virtue, Education and the Plans of Life

Konstantine Boudouris

Greek thought, from Homer and Hesiod, through the Pre-Socratics, to Plato, Aristotle and beyond, uses the words ‘good,’ ‘noble’ and ‘virtue’¹ as terms of praise for a certain person, a certain state of affairs or a certain thing. Hence these terms are burdened with heavy axiological content.

The term ‘virtue’ declares some special ability, skill and perfection that a man or a woman or other beings might have, and which can be demonstrated in particular circumstances. Thus initially, for example, courage is a virtue possessed by men that is mainly demonstrated in war, whereas women are endowed with other virtues which are more closely related to female nature and to the actions performed by women.² Virtues are considered as dispositions, which may be manifested in certain cases but later on become characteristics-qualities of men that mainly manifest their relationship with other people and with the circumstances that ensue within the political community. Thus every being can have its virtue, and a man can have the common virtue (or virtues) depending on his/her gender, age, situation and ambitions.³

¹ For the content of the term “virtue” and other terms related to it, as well as for the content of its opposites (such as evil, obscenity etc.) see Adkins (1960), 30-60. For a recent discussion of views of the Homeric world on virtue and the heroic way of life, see Collobert (2014), and Apressyan (2014).

² Adkins (2014), 32-36. The virtues considered to be characteristically female are beauty, the ability to run the household, weaving skill, faithfulness and purity. As is understandable in the framework of Homeric community of kings and of the supremacy of the stronger *lineages*, the model and the kinds of virtue are defined mostly by men, who seem to have the primary social role.

³ From Homeric times and onward the recognized virtues were *diligence* (Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 297-298), courage, wisdom (and temperance) and mainly *justice*, which is a virtue in the ethical sense. According to Hesiod justice does not belong to other beings, such as reptiles, birds, fish etc. Hesiod says the following: “For this is the Rule for men, that the son of Cronos has given – for the fish and the beasts and the winged birds, that they should devour one another, for they have no Justice among them – but to man he has given Justice and she proves to be far the best” (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 276-280, transl. by D. Greene). What Hesiod calls *Dikē* (Justice) is a divine entity (the daughter of Zeus), and has a certain metaphysical existence and status. Men of virtue must, among other things, be characterized by justice, says Hesiod (*Works and Days* 279). It is important to note that, in Plato as well as in Aristotle, the term ‘virtue’ is used in its original sense and means ability. That is why in the *Meno* (71e-72a1) Plato speaks of the virtue of a man, virtue of a woman, of a child, of a slave, virtue of a free man; and in Aristotle there is talk of the *virtue of the eye*, *virtue of the horse* and the *virtue of man* (*Nic. Ethics*, 1106a17-20).

However, from the age of the Pre-Socratics the demand for man's self-knowledge intensifies,⁴ philosophical anthropology is widened, and psychological analysis is deepened. Later on (in the age of Plato) mainly due to the conceptual overturn,⁵ the erosion of previously existing codes of communication, and the disorder of sociopolitical relationships that followed as a catastrophic consequence of the Peloponnesian war, it becomes necessary among city-states to inquire into the sociopolitical and ethical restitution of life. That is, when words have lost their meaning, when there is disagreement and the social tissue is unwoven, and when the models/paradigms (such as virtues) – necessary points of reference for society and the cooperation of citizens with a view to the common good – are overturned or lack meaning, then it seems necessary to pursue the formation of a rationally and commonly accepted way of life. In such a situation virtues are usually better redefined as models/paradigms according to their structure, their content and the scope of their application. Around the end of the fifth century B.C., this gigantic work was undertaken, as is obvious already in his early dialogues,⁶ by the Athenian philosopher Plato, who superbly investigates the content of ethical virtues, the

⁴ For example, Heraclitus emphasizes the importance of self-knowledge by saying "I have searched myself" (fr. 101 and 111). For Heraclitus' views on self-knowledge see Boudouris (1996).

⁵ During his youth Plato had certainly lived the drama of the Greeks during the Peloponnesian war and had personally experienced the situations that the great historian Thucydides describes when he speaks about the change of the meaning of the terms of language during the war. Thus, Thucydides writes: "The ordinary acceptance of words in their relation to things was changed as men thought fit. Reckless audacity came to be regarded as courageous loyalty to party, prudent hesitation as specious cowardice, moderation as a cloak for unmanly weakness, and to be clever in everything was to do naught in anything. Frantic impulsiveness was accounted a true man's part, but caution in deliberation a specious pretext for shirking. The hot-headed man was always trusted, his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was clever, and he who had detected one was still shrewder; on the other hand, he who made it his aim to have no need of such things was a disrupter of party and scared of his opponents. In a word, both he that got ahead of another who intended to do something evil and he that prompted to evil one who had never thought of it were alike commended. Furthermore, the tie of blood was weaker than the tie of party, because the partisan was more ready to dare without demur; for such associations are not entered into for the public good in conformity with the prescribed laws, but for selfish aggrandizement contrary to the established laws. Their pledges to one another were confirmed not so much by divine law as by common transgression of the law. Fair words proffered by opponents, if these had the upper hand, were received with caution as to their actions and not in a generous spirit." (Thucydides, Vol III, LXXXII,4-8, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge Mass. 1953)

⁶ Thus in the *Charmides* he discusses *temperance*, in the *Euthyphro* *piety*, in the *Laches* *courage*, in the *Lysis* *friendship*, in *Euthydemus* *knowledge*, in the *Protagoras* he speaks of four fundamental virtues (*courage, temperance, wisdom, justice*) and of the teachability of virtue and introduces the doctrine of the unity of virtues (*Protagoras* 349b1-d1), and in the *Meno* the question of "what is virtue" is posed again, since if we do not know what something is, we cannot decide whether it is teachable or not. The scope of the meaning of virtues changes in accordance with the area of their application, and thus one discerns four general virtues, as well as other, more particular ones (such as *piety*). Justice is examined in the *Republic* and is understood as the most general and necessary virtue for the political community already from the age of the Pre-Socratics.

relationships between virtues, the unity of virtues and the relation between ethical and political life of the citizens,⁷ always articulated within a just state established correctly upon principles.

This procedure may take place objectively and phenomenologically not only in connection with civil and other strife, but also in the case of invasion, occupation and destruction of a political community or a state by foreign forces.⁸ Similarly, this process can take place within the soul of every young person who lives in a free and open political community, for example during the period when the youth begins his/her education and organizes his/her own way of life. That is, after all, the reason why Platonic philosophy of education remains unsurpassed and always timely, for every free man can somehow plan his life. In the same way, every state accepts exactly this process through the education it provides, and often takes responsibility for the establishment of the best possible conditions to enable creation of a consistent and becoming form of life or a way of life that is worth living.

The planning of an original ethical life as an answer to the question “How should one live?” seems to be, according to Plato, the main work of philosophical activity within the state. What Plato in his early and certain other dialogues attempts with his philosophical analysis and dialectic, consists of making clear the meaning and the relationships of the terms that constitute the ethical tissue of language within a society whose members have generally the same or similar forms and ways of life. He further wants to point, albeit indirectly, at the necessity of establishing (through language and mainly through paradigmatic actions) common and accepted models of life, so that society may avoid disintegration, reconstruct itself and elevate itself ethically and politically to the benefit of its citizens.

The ideal of an ethical life that follows from philosophical discussion and the analytical examination of things as an answer to the question “How should one live?” is essentially embodied in one historical figure,⁹ that of Socrates,¹⁰ whose life is endowed with fundamental virtues and, among other things, is

⁷ In his early dialogues, by examining the problems related to virtues, Plato does not attempt to write elegant dialogical treatises that were, according to some interpreters (such as G. Ryle in *Plato's Progress*), most probably read out in the public places in Athens, but does something more important and essential: he pursues the establishment of the form and the way of life of citizens upon logically sound and axiologically important and accepted bases (as is shown in the *Gorgias*).

⁸ As, for example, happened in Greek history with the Romans and later with the invasion of various barbarian tribes (the Huns, the Vandals, the Goths, etc.) into the Roman and Byzantine Empire itself, and also today with the intense population migrations created by the process of globalization and other reasons.

⁹ Compare what Plato says about the harmony between words and deeds in Socrates' personality (*Laches* 188c4d-190a6).

¹⁰ Socrates' personality, his way of life, as portrayed already in the *Apology*, in the *Crito* and elsewhere, aims at promoting it as mainly an ethical model of life.

marked by the harmony of words and deeds. The central point of reference for this life is always the life of the state and particularly of the city of Athens. Therefore it seems that, according to Plato, it is not enough for a philosopher to simply perform a continuous, analytical and synthetic examination of ethical and other realities of the political community and their relationships, as these can be illustrated, described and manifested through language; rather, he needs to proceed toward the articulation of proposals for the establishment of specific models of life, which render the philosophical activity¹¹ within the state understandable, socially accepted, useful and beneficial. Most importantly, the philosopher who introduces or suggests something good must lead a life in accordance with what he is suggesting or supporting.

How, then, does the Athenian philosopher conceive the plan of life and what does he understand about it?

The planning of ethical life for man as such must necessarily be founded upon deep knowledge of what it is to be a man, the essence of man, and must be sustained by principles (such as rationality, consistency, stability and clarity) and ideals (such as virtues). The plan of life for Plato means that, in the first place, man is obliged through the power and aid of education to shape his being, that is to cultivate his soul with excessive care, thus adorning it with ethical and other virtues that fully distinguish and satisfy his life and contribute to his prosperity (eudaimonia). These virtues, e.g. courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice, should be understood on the one hand as ethical ideals with universal social acceptance that completely satisfy man's soul,¹² and on the

¹¹ This work of philosophy is under normal circumstances necessary for education of the youth who are objectively under great pressure because they have to choose their way of life and are obliged to choose the path of virtue (or vice), or to always proceed without awareness and questioning, simply following tradition. In the early dialogues, Plato seems to demand from the youth to be able to justify their beliefs and views, or at least not to accept contradictory opinions. This in reality means that, since they live in a political community, they are obliged to carefully *plan* their life (either by themselves or with the help of others, e.g. family, school, or the state) to their own benefit and the benefit of the political community in which they live and which, under normal circumstances, they cannot renounce or reject. The rejection of the political community (whatever form it may take) leads to their own harm. The question "How to live?" is for the youth either torturous or often devoid of meaning and as such dangerous for social consensus whenever the framework that renders possible its examination does not exist. However, when there exist functioning institutions (such as family, school, etc.) that can provide the context within which a satisfactory and convincing answer can be given to the youth, then society can move slowly and steadily towards the establishment of a political community with accepted strong models. However, under abnormal circumstances the important thing is the relationship of the political community (and of course the youth within it) with the cultural tradition of the nation or the country that is being tested. Still, even in that case, the youth have to, directly or indirectly, either with intense doubts or quietly, answer the question "How to live?"

¹² Of course, these virtues do not have the same content as special abilities or "virtues" of horses, dogs, birds, fish, etc. Plato clearly distinguishes between ethical-moral and non-ethical virtues in the *Meno*.

other as dispositions that may occasionally manifest themselves within the political community and become lasting characteristics, depending on the goals set and desired by individuals and collective social and political entities.

The life plan can initially be somewhat general¹³ and it can later on be specified with reference to the powers of man's soul, as human being, but also to the goals that every man sets and aspires to within a particular sociopolitical environment. In any case every phase of this planning must be guided by internal consent in order for it to have any result. Certainly something cannot be understood as a life plan if it is not ruled by virtues but by often-changing and unstable appetites and idiosyncratic desires of any particular man. The way of life guided by often-changeable and unstable desires is characterized by Plato as the life of a glutton¹⁴ and the life of a thief,¹⁵ that is, as an unacceptable and unworthy life. Understandably, the desires (as appetites and urges according to the Stoics) necessarily lead us to something, lead us to one or other action or deed. Desire, as a natural characteristic of man, is not in itself something bad. However, a life that in its actions does not take into consideration the stable ethical models (virtues and other principles) cannot be prominent, since the socially prominent is defined with reference to the commonly accepted logical and ethical models within the political community and not according to subjective and personal desires and demands of each individual. Of course, virtues are also combined with other inclinations and ambitions that men who act within a political community possess, such as the need for work they have to perform in order to secure means for living, as well as their endeavor to acquire rank and other social goods (such as fame, honor, wealth). Undoubtedly these goods are understood as something useful and necessary, but the combination and evaluation of the virtues of the soul, of the body (health, beauty), and of social goods (honor, fame, ranks, wealth), is very significant. The order and the hierarchy of these goods are very important. Plato gives an analysis and clarification of these axiological relations first in the *Gorgias*¹⁶ and then exposes it elaborately in the *Republic*.¹⁷

¹³ According to the Aristotelian expression it is defined *roughly* and *summarily* (*Nic. Eth.* 1094b20).

¹⁴ *Gorgias* 481c-522e.

¹⁵ *Gorgias* 507e3. In the *Gorgias*, in opposition to the life of a thief, the noblest is a virtuous life in accordance with justice: "to live and die in the pursuit of righteousness and all other virtues" (*Gorgias* 527e3-5).

¹⁶ *Gorgias* 481c-522e.

¹⁷ The relevant passage in the *Republic* says the following: "When I had said this I supposed that I was done with the subject, but it all turned out to be only a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always an intrepid, enterprising spirit in everything, would not on this occasion acquiesce in Thrasymachus' abandonment of his case, but said, Socrates, is it your desire to seem to have persuaded us or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be just than unjust? - Really, I said, if the choice rested with me. - Well, then, you are not doing what you wish. For tell me, do you agree that there is a kind of good which we would choose to possess, not from desire, not for its after effects, but

Furthermore, since every man can plan his life inside the state based on principles and virtues, but can still live his life in his own unique way and mode, that is why there can exist diversity of kinds and ways of life in the political community,¹⁸ as is clear from the early Platonic dialogues, as well as the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Statesman* and the *Laws*. Thus, Plato speaks of the life of desire (such as that dominated by a love of wine, a love of the body, a love of pleasures, etc.), the life of opinion, but also of the rational way of life. Similarly he speaks of the agricultural (or the artisan's) way of life, the chrematistic (or financial life), the liturgical life (or life of divination), the life of war (or the life of leaders), the erotic life, life devoted to beauty and the philosophical way of life. The ways of life seem to be articulated by each dominant inclination or urge of the soul toward something, in combination with the situation of every man and the circumstances of the state (the state of training and education, functioning of institutions, etc.). It seems that there are no pure or unmixed types and ways of life, as the *Philebus* shows. In each case the dominant element gives the color and often the essence to the kinds and ways of lives. However, to the extent in which it is possible for these lives to exist, it means that the weight of articulation and the color of each life is influenced by the factors which are related to common education (which, according to Plato, should be provided by the state), but also by the responsibility of citizens who choose and partly freely decide how they should live. The ways of life that have nothing to do with principles and virtue, but are rather formed willfully (and as such publicly and harmfully demonstrate their depravity), should be forbidden and prevented by laws and generally institutions of the state. That is why the main concern of the state is to educate its citizens with virtue. And that is why education in any state, small or large, is necessarily always education in virtue.¹⁹

welcoming it for its own sake? - As, for example, joy and such pleasures as are harmless and nothing results from them afterward save to have and to hold the enjoyment? - I recognize that kind, said I. - And again a kind that we love both for its own sake and for its consequences such as understanding, sight, and health? For these I presume we welcome for both reasons. - Yes, I said. - And can you discern a third form of good under which fall exercise- and being healed when sick and the art of healing and the making of money generally? For of them we would say that they are laborious and painful yet beneficial, and for their own sake we would not accept them, but only for the rewards and other benefits that accrue from them. - Why yes, I said, I must admit this third class also. But what of it? - In which of these classes do you place justice? he said, - In my opinion, I said, it belongs in the fairest class, that which a man who is to be happy must love both for its own sake and for the results." (*Republic* 357a1-358a3. Transl. by Paul Shorey, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, edited by E. Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Pantheon Books 1964)

¹⁸ For the kinds of life and the form of life see Boudouris (1970), 116-126, 255-262.

¹⁹ This has been pointed out in relation to the contemporary state of affairs and with reference to Plato and Aristotle in Coumoundouros and Polansky (2008), 23, where they emphasize that every education is an education in virtue.

For Plato, therefore, philosophy is understood as a quest, as theoretical and practical, as an art (*techné*) that, among other things, aims at the investigation and planning of the way of life worth living for a man in the state. Such work is necessary and beneficial, but the possible and recommended plans of life should be understood more as flexible forms of art than as rigid products. It is indeed noteworthy that Plato notes the diversity of ways of life within the political community even though he does not believe that all the ways of life are equally valuable. Still the task of philosophy as the art of establishing the best way of life is not futile; rather it redeems and evaluates its work.

It is exactly this important and dominant idea and contribution of Platonic philosophy that Aristotle accepts and further develops, most notably in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*.

For Plato, every soul (uncorrupted by the Sophists) desires the good²⁰ and by nature is inclined toward it and of course towards virtue. According to Aristotle, every being can attain the virtue that is intertwined with its nature. Thus for him there exists virtue of the horse, virtue of the eye and virtue of the man, but the term virtue is here used in the general sense of special ability possessed by every being. Aristotle speaks of the natural virtue of every being and distinguishes between the natural virtue of man and real virtue. According to him, “all men think that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for self-control or brave or have the other moral qualities; but yet we seek something else as that which is real good — we seek for the presence of such qualities in another way.”²¹ That is why Aristotle accepts that “neither by nature nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.”²² This conception supports the view that virtues can be understood as dispositions²³ and that we can acquire virtues by practice, by habit (hence they can become states or characteristics-qualities of the soul). Virtue in general is also voluntary, in the sense that its acquisition requires our positive will and free choice in our effort to improve and perfect all the circumstances and situations of our life, and first and foremost of our very soul, with the real good²⁴ as our main goal.

²⁰ For the Socratic doctrines that “everyone desires the good” and “nobody is deliberately evil” see *Protagoras* 355a5-b1 and 385c6-d4, *Gorgias* 467d6-468c8, and *Meno* 77b6-78b2.

²¹ *NE* 1144b4-8.

²² *NE* 1103a23-25. For a recent in-depth discussion of this issue see Anagnostopoulos (2014).

²³ See also Attfield (2012), 5.

²⁴ Aristotle defends this commonly accepted view in the first book of *Nicomachean Ethics* (ch. 7), while in book 10 he introduces theoretical life (see Attfield [2012], 4) as the noblest way of life, the essentially happy life. Cooper (2012), 141-143, distinguishes between the philosopher of human matters (which Aristotle expresses as *philosophy of human things*, consisting both of virtuous citizens and political philosophers) and the philosopher who lives a theoretical life. These two ways of life are not mutually exclusive.

According to the Stagirite philosopher, virtues are divided into intellectual and ethical ones. Intellectual virtue relates to teaching (and demands experience, research and time), whereas moral virtue concerns all men and is related to ethos, which is connected to tradition, to the everyday practical activities, exchanges and generally human activities that preoccupy the philosophy of human things. Hence, we acquire ethical virtues when we get involved in the respective activities of everyday life and not simply in a theoretical way (e.g. in teaching). About that, the Stagirite says the following:

but excellences we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by doing, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.

This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator; and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.

Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every excellence is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need for a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the excellences also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel, fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly.²⁵

Indeed, the Stagirite emphasizes that *Nicomachean Ethics* is not a purely theoretical²⁶ treatise, but rather a discourse on the things that need to be done so *that we become good*²⁷ and that with respect to deeds knowledge is not very important (*{knowledge} is of little value*), but rather whether the doer acts deliberately and purposefully ... and *his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character*.²⁸ He also stresses that nobody has the slightest

²⁵ NE 1103a31-1103b17. (Transl. By W.D. Ross, revised by J. O. Urmson. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation edited by Jonathan Barnes, vol. two, Bollingen Series, Princeton University Press 1984)

²⁶ NE 1103a31-1103b18.

²⁷ NE 1103b26-28.

²⁸ NE 1105a28-33: "but if the acts that are in accordance with the excellences have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he

chance of being good unless he/she performs good deeds. The majority believes the opposite and “most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a course of treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy.”²⁹

That is why in relation to virtues the proper and early training and education are of primary importance. This education should be provided by the state. The ethical knowledge it provides is not theoretical but living and practical so to speak, and it is certainly connected to the habituation of ethical virtue. Doing virtuous things, as well as training and education in virtuous ways of life, demands a decisive choice to want to live virtuously (and not simply to understand what virtue is) and to constantly insist on this goal. Honest involvement, practice and persistence in this gradually lead to the acquisition of a specific form of practical experience and knowledge about the morality of life. Therefore, an educated man can and should practice in order to acquire virtues (both intellectual and ethical ones); and that is why there is only education (or instruction/training) through virtue and in virtue.

However, what is the goal of education? Or better, what should a living active man strive for? The answer to that question seems to be found to the main axes of Aristotle’s metaphysics, ethical and political philosophy.

According to Aristotle, every art, action, research, deed and purpose “aims at its good.”³⁰ That is why all things desire the good. However, the deeds and action differ among themselves. Hence also the aims (goals) are different, as well as the goods to which the particular goals are directed. There is no one and only good, but the good is named in many ways. The entities and situations that are called ‘good’ do not have the same structure and do not always have something in common, but the relations between them can better be described by what Wittgenstein calls “family resemblances relationship.”³¹ With regard to the deeds, Aristotle notices that, if there is some final aim that we desire and for which we act, that has to be the good and the noblest. Of course, it is not possible to always desire something for the sake of something else, for that leads to infinity and a choice of that kind seems aimless and meaningless.

must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.”

²⁹ *NE* 1105b12-18.

³⁰ *NE* 1094a1-2.

³¹ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, par. 66-67. See also Boudouris (1977), 192-197.

Thus there should be an end to action. The ultimate end of actions as such is happiness (eudaimonia) and all agree on that, but give different content to the term “happiness” (some think it is virtue, others pleasure, yet others fame, wealth, honor, etc.). So the agreement is only declarative. This disagreement as to what happiness really is leads to the formation of different kinds and ways of life (so one can speak of the hedonistic life, life of pleasure, life of fame, financial life, theoretical life, etc.).

The next important question that emerges in relation to the ways and plans of life is the following: Are all these ways of life equal, do they have the same status, or could perhaps different ways of life, or different plans of life, be differentiated, separately evaluated, and appraised respectively. Aristotle accepts the view that indeed different types and ways of life can be logically discussed and axiologically differentiated, always of course mainly with respect to a certain stable context, such as the life of Greek polis. For that reason, mostly following Plato, he puts forward arguments to explain why pleasure, honor, or knowledge, cannot be the final and superior good. According to Aristotle, men should shape their life in such a way that the particular goals they set for themselves serve a certain final goal, which can only be the one final goal of life, that is happiness (eudaimonia). For him, it is impossible to have two or three final goals of life, because our logical choices are reduced in practice.³² Thus our goals may be many, they may be rearticulated and reordered, but they always have to serve one final goal, provided that our actions and practice are hierarchically ordered in relation to the final goal. However, as contemporary researchers have noted,³³ the fact that there may be many goals and that therefore the agent is obliged to continuously restructure and adjust them to the circumstances, so that they lead to one final goal, seems to demand something unnatural, and often something that distorts things. That is why John Rawls and others believe that this Aristotelian argument should be rejected and furthermore claim that it is impossible to support the view that there is one single plan of life.

Indeed, our plan of life, with the starting point and main choice the desire as preference for something we deem good, does not seem to satisfy; since the choice, as something simply desired, may be pleasure, for example, and then all our actions would incline towards the satisfaction of hedonistic life, which according to Aristotle does not amount to happiness.

³² See Santas (1996), 101.

³³ Rawls (1988), 424, writes specifically about the Aristotelian principle and plan of life.

That is why Aristotle, in order to clarify things, uses another argument called “the function of man,” otherwise known in literature as the functional argument (*NE* 1097b22-1098a18).³⁴

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of *what it is* still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he naturally functionless? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle (of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought); and as this too can be taken in two ways, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle, and if we say a so-and-so and a good so-and-so have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases,

³⁴ The argument in question has wrongly been called the functional argument. Aristotle’s phrase “to ascertain the function of man” has, in my opinion, been misinterpreted. For it should not mean that it is related to some function that man performs naturally, but simply states the view that man *as a human being* should do that which is appropriate for him and only for him, and not for other beings. The analogy with the function performed by other craftsmen should be taken less stringently. Therefore, the meaning is the following: There are works and deeds done by the gods and others done by men (“the works of men and of gods” in Homer, *Odyssey* I.388; “these works are the concern of men” in Aeschylus, *Libation Bearers* 673; Plato, *Gorgias* 517c). A man performs many works and deeds. Perhaps there is a deed that is (or should be) essentially his own, the deed characteristic of his nature? Perhaps a man should care more than anything else about something that is essentially human, namely the cultivation of his soul (the *care of the soul* according to Socrates)? It is, therefore, a profound Aristotelian insight. It is as if Aristotle wants to speak of the most important work that a man has to do as *human being per se*, which is the care and the cultivation of his soul. This human work should be his most important function. It is thus Aristotle’s primarily ethical *choice*, which he tries to clarify (somewhat awkwardly) through the analogy with crafts. The logic that subsists and guides the work of man is not a functional (calculating) form of logic, but rather a purely metaphysical and primarily ethical choice. It is a *principle* and a *duty* that must guide a man’s life in order for it to be worth living. One may, of course, disagree with such a main choice, but Aristotle’s view hides a profound truth confirmed by man’s general effort to transcend his plain physical condition and enter the realm of aims and of civilization.

eminence in respect of excellence being added to the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, [and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case,] human good turns out to be activity of soul in conformity with excellence, and if there are more than one excellence, in conformity with the best and most complete. But we must add ‘in a complete life’.

This argument says that, just as for every piper, sculptor and every other artisan, the good and the noblest is interrelated with the work he does, the same could (and should) happen with man, who needs to perform his function. And what is the essential function of man as human being? That consists in his doing that which fulfills his nature, his soul, and which is “an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle,”³⁵ the virtue familiar to man, the “human good” as the activity of the soul that happens in accordance to virtue, “excellence, in conformity with the best and most complete... in a complete life.”³⁶ Hence the essential function of man is the cultivation of the faculties of the soul and primarily of his spiritual powers (and not just satisfaction of his desires and appetites). It is the development and ordering of man through the ethical and intellectual virtues and finally his spiritual and theoretical life. Having distinguished between practical philosophy and knowledge on the one hand, and theoretical philosophy and knowledge on the other, Aristotle further accepts two ways of life, namely the ethical life, which all men (including philosophers) can and should live within the political community, and the essentially virtuous life that is philosophical or theoretical life.³⁷

The ethical virtue of man consists in practice, control and regulation of desires and passions by reason; as something entirely voluntary, ethical virtue aims at happiness, which is “an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue.”³⁸ Therefore the main function of man is to perform deeds that immanently correlate with the virtue of the soul, which virtue is his very nature, and which constitutes essential human good.

Which actions exactly can a man do every time is, of course, a question of choice among many existing goals and aims. That is why the forms and ways of life are different, but that does not mean that all the ways of life are equal or

³⁵ *NE* 1098a14.

³⁶ *NE* 1098a15-18.

³⁷ See also Cooper (2012), 140-143.

³⁸ *NE* 1102a6-7.

with equal status, nor that they all get the approval of reason. The goals set by men or the political community (sometimes superficial and temporary and sometimes more thorough and stable) can be evaluated and judged by how much they serve the main function of man, which is the development of the faculties and virtues of his soul. The development and flourishing of the powers of the soul (and primarily of the mind) lead to happiness. However, no happiness, as the final and ultimate goal of action, is possible without virtue (understood as ethical and intellectual action).

Since ethical action as practical is related to moral and practical life in general, and is not necessarily affected by any other developments observable in the fields examined by exact sciences, Aristotelian ethical philosophy of the structure of virtues and happiness still remains valid and useful as an essential philosophy of human affairs.³⁹ Aristotelian ethical philosophy is not a 'scientific ethics' (such ethics, according to Aristotle, is impossible). Rather, it is a highest practical deed of the soul that should relate to things and circumstances of life in every human community. Hence, every education is primarily education in virtue and no way or plan of life is acceptable without the involvement of virtue in the whole process of "educating for the matters of the state."⁴⁰

³⁹ It is indeed worth mentioning here that the method of examination of ethical-political issues, according to Aristotle, should not search for the exact but rather "to indicate the truth roughly and in outline" and that "it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject" (*NE*1094b20-25). It is therefore obvious that the Stagirite philosopher methodologically differentiates the inquiry into ethical-political issues from those methods used in the fields today associated with the exact sciences. This Aristotelian conception of the property of mostly ethical reality is extremely important and renders his arguments about moral life notable and valid even today. This Aristotelian position is a profound conception and philosophy of human matters. Besides, the recent neoliberal attempts of the Chicago School that try to examine the issues of moral life (e.g. of justice) in a scientific manner do not seem to be productive. One speaks, for example, of economic analysis of the law. About that, one could note the following: The Law (as the rules of law and judicial decisions) and the Economy (economic activities, exchanges and commissions) assume that men, under normal circumstances, generally act rationally. The rationale, regardless of the form it may take, seems to connect the legal issues with those of economy, without rendering the relevant procedures identical. And although it can hardly be denied that legal rules and judicial decisions can have economic consequences or be economically appraised, this association does not affect the core of the law. As the saying goes: *fiat justitia et pereat mundus*. To demand, for example, from a criminal justice system to deliver decisions according to economic criteria, or to correlate such decisions with economic factors seems to amount to the abolition of law. Justice as such must not be quantified and therefore also should not be made scientific; the essence of justice is of a different order from that of law since it is related to the profound morality of a person. Any attempt at quantifying moral life and *justice per se* constitutes a category mistake. Thus, what P. Gemtos, Ar. Hatzis and others claim, following the Chicago School (R. Coase, R. Posner etc.), does not seem to concern the essence of law, but of the just; see Hatzis (2012).

⁴⁰ The contemporary electronic technological research of communication and hence of the meaning of political community does not cancel Aristotle's views, but rather enhances the field of their application. Even though I am inclined towards a conception of an ecological culture (in order to avoid the destruction of the way of life of people whose life is intertwined with different materials), I do believe the Aristotelian conception to be of great significance. Undoubtedly, Aristotelian moral

In conclusion, one notes the following: the Classical Greek doctrine of virtue of Plato and Aristotle emphasizes the importance of virtues (temperance, piety, wisdom, courage, justice, soberness, etc.) for the constitution of a lasting way of life. The morality of life has precedence in the political community. Even though in Aristotle virtues are differentiated into ethical and intellectual, they are still united in the action by sensibleness, so as to secure the inner consent of the agent, and indeed in order to preserve, even if for the few, the possibility of ascent to the theoretical (or purely philosophical) life, which, among other things, is the only way to guarantee the right path of the political community towards a virtuous life.⁴¹

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philosophy, if properly interpreted, has vitality, value, and can even today up to a point provide the basis for an acceptable way of life for any political community, since it, among other things, postulates the principle of consistency and rationality.

⁴¹ The classical Chinese doctrine of virtue (Confucius, Mencius etc.) certainly prescribes morality to political community, in contrast with profitability per se and the knowledge (see Mencius' response to the king Hui of Liang, in *The Works of Mencius*, Book I, part I, Chapter I). The unity of morality and knowledge occurs in the person of the sage. The connection of moral life with tradition refers to what the classical Greeks also constantly understood as ethos, but for the latter the ethos and tradition are not absolute, as in Confucius and Mencius, since the theoretical life provides the ultimate criterion for the essentially happy life. However, both the Greek and the classical Chinese philosophy reject the view that it is possible to have a form and a way of life worth living without a plan and without man's striving for the good life.

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What is the Subject of Plato's Charmides?

Voula Tsouna

Plato's *Charmides* has been a focus of controversy on many counts, including its authorship, relative dating, characters, structure and purpose.¹ This is due to both the rare artistic complexity of the work and the major philosophical challenges addressed in the course of the enquiry conducted by the principal interlocutors. Indeed, a striking element of the dialogue is that, in addition to Socrates, the protagonists of the dialogue are Charmides and Critias, whose historical counterparts were relatives of Plato and became the leaders of the infamous regime of the Thirty (404-3 BC) approximately thirty years after the dramatic date of the *Charmides* (432 BC). Plato's apparently peculiar choice of characters raises two interrelated questions, one pertaining to the purpose for which the dialogue was written, the other bearing on the status of the philosophical views that are submitted to scrutiny. In particular, it is debated whether Plato wrote the *Charmides* to establish that Socrates was innocent of the guilt of association with the future tyrants by showing them in a bad light and by putting in their mouth views that Socrates altogether rejects or, alternatively, to exonerate his relatives by throwing a favourable light on their qualities and motives and by highlighting their philosophical affinity with Socrates. Yet others claim that, in the *Charmides*, Socrates puts to the test his own methodological principles (especially, the *technē* analogy) as well as his intellectualist beliefs concerning the virtues, and finds both of them wanting. Hence, as has often been suggested, this dialogue marks a turning point in Plato's career, insofar as he criticises and rejects aspects of the philosophy of Socrates and shows himself ready to spread his own wings.

Further controversies derive from the structure of the dialogue, which appears to many to be composed of two rather disconnected parts. In the first part (153a-164d or 166e), after an elaborate prologue (153a-159a), Socrates engages in a dialectical conversation with the youth Charmides with an evident pedagogical goal in mind: to lead him to express and examine his own beliefs about *sōphrosynē*, temperance, and to find out whether or not that virtue is

¹ Gould (1955), 36, groups together the *Charmides*, *Hippias Minor*, and the first book of the *Republic* on the grounds that they have at least one thing in common: they may all be called Plato's 'problem plays' in the sense that they all have caused controversy regarding their real significance.

present in him. Initially, Charmides defines *sōphrosynē* as ‘some sort of quietness’ or ‘doing everything in a decorous and quiet manner’ (159b), then as *aidōs*, a sense of shame (160e), and finally as doing one’s own (161b) – a view that the young man suggests belongs to Critias. After Charmides is thrice refuted, Critias replaces him in the conversation with Socrates, modifies this latter definition of temperance into ‘the doing or making of good things’ (cf. 164e) and is refuted in due course. On most accounts, the second part of the dialogue (164d-176d) begins at this very point, when Critias concedes the previous argument to his interlocutor and makes a new start by defining *sōphrosynē* in terms of knowing *oneself* (164d). Aided by Socrates’ questioning, Critias develops self-knowledge in a way that leads him to claim that *sōphrosynē* is a sort of knowledge or science (*epistēmē*) which ‘alone of all the sciences is a science of both itself and the other sciences’ and also ‘of the lack of knowledge or science’ (*anepistēmosynē*) (166e). The rest of the dialogue is devoted to the development and refutation of that definition. However, there is no agreement as to whether or how the definitions advanced in the work are related to each other and, in particular, whether or how the argument occupying the second half of the dialogue bears on earlier phases of the dialectical conversation. Equally problematic has been found Critias’ apparently arbitrary leap from the definition of temperance as knowing *oneself* to its definition as knowing *itself* as well as other items like itself, namely, the other knowledges or sciences (166c).² Worse, Critias’ definition of the virtue in terms of self-knowledge appears intended to bring to mind Socrates’ views concerning virtue and the quest for self-knowledge in the *Apology* and other Platonic writings. Nonetheless no one seems to agree with anyone else as to how the former conception is related to the latter: some claim that they are identical, others that they stand in opposition to each other, yet others specify their alleged similarities and differences in different ways. Furthermore, pressing questions can be raised regarding each of these different trends of interpretation. For instance, if Critias’ and Socrates’ notions of self-knowledge are one and the same, what are we to infer from the fact that, in the *Charmides*, the aforementioned notion is refuted? If, on the other hand, they are different, what is the rôle of Socratic self-knowledge vis-a-vis Critianic self-knowledge in the course of the argument? Moreover, it is not clear how either of these conceptions, or both, may be linked to the long prologue of the *Charmides*, which, by all accounts, seems to be significant with regard to the development of the argument in the main body of the dialogue? Without wishing to oversimplify matters, I think that it is fair to say that, for the most part, earlier interpretations of the dialogue belonging to the analytic tradition manifest a tendency to overlook the prologue’s bearing on the argument, whereas approaches following Straussian and other interpretative

² Tuckey (1951) offers an informative survey of earlier literature on that question.

frameworks center on the prologue and use it to read in-between the lines of the dialectical debate that follows. Ultimately, these problems pertain to the unity of the *Charmides* as well as its subject: what is, really, the topic of the *Charmides* and how are the different aspects and elements of the dialogue integrated into a single whole? How one answers this question has crucial exegetic and philosophical implications. For in addition to shaping one's understanding of the dialogue, one's answer affects one's view about Socratic intellectualism concerning the virtues, bears on the vexed issue of Plato's philosophical development or literary and philosophical project, and calls for a re-assessment of the rôle of the *Charmides* in the systematic presentation of Plato's views.

I

To begin, it may be useful to mention certain prominent lines of interpretation concerning the main subject of the dialogue. Several of them can be traced back to nineteenth and early twentieth century scholarship and also occur in more recent publications. For reasons of space, this brief survey is both selective and schematic: primarily, I refer to the few existing monographs on the dialogue and to representative article-length studies. While in some cases I sketch a line of interpretation exactly as the author develops it, in other cases, for reasons of economy and convenience, I single out certain aspects of an interpretation leaving out others. The purpose of the survey is to provide some background for the present argument, and also convey a sense of the depth and significance of the issues at stake.

One fairly common approach is biographical and political. Depending on whether its proponents take Plato's representations of Charmides and Critias to be benign or malignant, they contend that the ultimate purpose of the dialogue is to be defensive on behalf of these individuals or apologetic on behalf of Socrates. As mentioned, Plato is supposed to have composed the dialogue either in order to morally redeem his relatives to the extent that this is possible or, more often, to implicitly condemn them by indicating the gap between Socrates' attitude and their own beliefs.³ Certain variants of this approach attempt

³ Most interpreters endorse the negative portrait of Critias depicted by Xenophon and other ancient authors (e.g., *Mem* 1.2.12-16, 29-30), extend this view to include Charmides as well, and attribute to Plato a strategy comparable to that of Xenophon: in the *Charmides*, he takes care to stress that Socrates and Critias have different values and therefore the former cannot be held responsible for the evil deeds of the latter when he assumed power. See, notably, Hyland (1981); Kahn (1996, 1997); Lampert (2010); Landy (1998); Levine (1976, 1984); and Schmid (1998). On the other hand, Tuozzo (2011), 51-90, questions that approach. On the grounds of a careful survey of the ancient evidence, he argues that Critias was a philo-laconian intellectual, conservative and elitist, who believed that the conservative aristocratic values including, prominently, *sōphrosynē*, are crucial to beneficial conduct but did not think that the many were capable of cultivating such values. Tuozzo presents a similarly sympathetic portrait of Charmides as well. Although I find attractive many of his claims, I find no evidence in the *Charmides* bearing out the claim that, for Plato, Critias does

to map pieces of historical information about Critias and Charmides onto their dialectical behaviour depicted in the text. For instance, it is suggested that Charmides' definitions of temperance, first, in terms of quiet and decorous behaviour and, then, as a proper sense of shame, reflect his automatic endorsement of conservative values; also, it is frequently emphasised that his third attempt to define temperance as doing one's own, which he appears to attribute to Critias, reveals his tendency to follow the opinions of his guardian in an unthinking manner. More importantly, such approaches try to connect Critias' beliefs as they are expressed in the *Charmides* with the cognitive elitism on account of which the historical Critias conducted the so-called 'purifications' of the state by killing vast numbers of citizens. According to certain scholars, Critias' impressive performance in the *Charmides* discloses that Plato felt sympathy for his cousin's ideology, though not for his deeds. According to Noburu Notomi, on the one hand, Plato acknowledges Critias' good intentions as well as the ignorance that led to his downfall and, on the other hand, he appears to realise that Socrates' cross-examination can undermine belief in the social and moral values, thus opening the way to political absolutism.⁴ Indeed, Notomi claims, Plato's political philosophy in the *Republic* lies farther away from Socrates' attitude but closer to Critias' position in the *Charmides*, namely, that the virtuous few who possess higher-order knowledge also ought to be the ones to rule. However, as Notomi himself notes, most interpreters of the *Charmides* argue that the dialogue reveals Plato's repulsion for the beliefs and values of his cousins. In fact, it is often contended, Socrates' well-timed references to a state ruled in accordance with the science of science points unmistakably to the central message of the dialogue: the intellectualist conception of temperance advanced by Critias must be rejected, not only because it is incoherent, but principally because it encapsulates the epistemic arrogance on account of which Critias and his associates felt entitled to 'purify' Athens in 404 BC.⁵

Some of the above ideas also occur in interpretations attempting to integrate the *Charmides* in broader frameworks which are frequently, but not always, of Straussian inspiration. In his book-length study *The Virtue of Philosophy*,⁶

"represent a positive strand of Greek political and cultural thought" (57; also Notomi (2000) cited by Tuozzo (2011), 57 n. 14). Nor do I agree that "there is no reason to think that [Plato] traces the disastrous outcome [of the political engagements of his cousins] to moral failings in either of them" (89). Rather, in my own view (Tsouna 2015), Plato's portraits convey both the positive elements of his characters and their flaws, both their potential to do good if they stick to the principles of philosophical education and their proclivity to do evil if they do not.

⁴ Notomi (2000).

⁵ Dusanić (2000).

⁶ Hyland (1981). See also Hyland (1968).