

PREFACE

The essays presented here represent work on ancient philosophy with special focus on Socrates and Plato. Most of them have been published elsewhere but are hopefully still relevant and are obviously now more easily accessible. Others originate in papers presented in various academic fora and are now published for the first time. An important motivation for collecting these essays is that they are focused on a few central topics and thus support each other in advocating interpretations that may deserve attention.

To make the coherence of this volume clear, the essays are grouped in three parts: Part I: *Socrates*, Part II: *Plato* and Part III: *Later Philosophy*. All this is introduced by a piece on *Pythagorean Principles*, an important forerunner of Platonic philosophy.

It should be noted that Part I on Socrates focuses on Socratic method, which has for some time been at the centre of my research. The essay ‘Socrates’ Argumentative Strategy’ (originally published in *Classica et Mediaevalia*) is here a centrepiece in that it seeks to collect evidence from all so-called Socratic dialogues to form a picture of the argumentation offered. This is very much a live topic today.

Part II has the following three focuses: the *Republic*, the *Timaeus* and psychology. The first deals with happiness, health and the good life; while the second deals with ontological questions and the third with various issues in Platonic psychology. I advocate an ‘Aristotelian’ view of the soul as necessarily embodied in the late dialogues generally. In my understanding even god (mind) needs a body (e.g., in the *Politicus*). A fourth focus is on Plato’s development and on how to read Plato, again a hotly discussed subject.

Part III has one paper on Aristotle’s conception of the good life and another on the transformation of Stoicism by Panaetius and Posidonius. They give us a new philosophy of man and psycho-pathology, and an immense trust in theoretical and practical reason controlled by observation of fact.

The essays composing the present volume all originate from the time I spent working in the Classics Department at Aarhus University, to which I owe thanks for allowing me to travel, research and teach this subject over the years. I am also indebted to colleagues in Scandinavia, the UK (Oxford and Cambridge) and the USA (Austin), and generally to members of the International Plato Society and to many students both in Denmark

and abroad who have been exposed to my views contained in these essays. I hope it is apparent that I have benefited from their reactions. However, needless to say, I am the only one responsible. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Marianne Gulstad Pedersen, Publizon A/S, who with great technical skill has made this publication possible. My final and warmest thanks go to my wife Gudrun for patience and caring support.

E.O.

Aarhus, February 2016

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- Note: Permission has kindly been given to reprint the essays listed above with *minor corrections*.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Aristoteles

<i>An. Pr.</i>	<i>Analytica Priora</i>
<i>An. Post.</i>	<i>Analytica Posteriora</i>
<i>Top.</i>	<i>Topica</i>
<i>SE</i>	<i>Sophistici Elenchi</i>
<i>Phys.</i>	<i>Physica</i>
<i>Cael.</i>	<i>De Caelo</i>
<i>Met.</i>	<i>Metaphysica</i>
<i>EN</i>	<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i>
<i>EE</i>	<i>Ethica Eudemia</i>
<i>MM</i>	<i>Magna Moralia</i>
<i>DA/De An.</i>	<i>De Anima</i>

Plato

<i>Alc.</i>	<i>Alcibiades</i>
<i>Ap. /Apol.</i>	<i>Apologia</i>
<i>Ch. /Chrm. /Charm.</i>	<i>Charmides</i>
<i>Crat.</i>	<i>Cratylus</i>
<i>Cr. /Cri. /Crit.</i>	<i>Crito</i>
<i>Criti.</i>	<i>Critias</i>
<i>Epist.</i>	<i>Epistula</i>
<i>Epin.</i>	<i>Epinomis</i>
<i>Eu. / Euphr. /Euthyph.</i>	<i>Euthyphro</i>
<i>Eud. / Euthyd.</i>	<i>Euthydemus</i>
<i>G. /Grg. /Gorg.</i>	<i>Gorgias</i>
<i>H. Ma. /H. Maj.</i>	<i>Hippias Major</i>
<i>H.Mi. /H.Min.</i>	<i>Hippias Minor</i>
<i>La. /Lach.</i>	<i>Laches</i>
<i>Lg. /Leg.</i>	<i>Leges</i>
<i>Ly. /Lys.</i>	<i>Lysis</i>
<i>M. /Men.</i>	<i>Meno</i>
<i>Menex.</i>	<i>Menexenus</i>
<i>Parm.</i>	<i>Parmenides</i>
<i>Phd.</i>	<i>Phaedo</i>
<i>Phdr.</i>	<i>Phaedrus</i>
<i>Phil.</i>	<i>Philebus</i>
<i>Pol. /Polit.</i>	<i>Politicus</i>

<i>Pr. /Prt. /Prot.</i>	<i>Protagoras</i>
<i>Rep.</i>	<i>Respublica</i>
<i>Smp. /Symp.</i>	<i>Symposium</i>
<i>Sph. /Soph.</i>	<i>Sophista</i>
<i>Tht.</i>	<i>Theaetetus</i>
<i>Ti. /Tim.</i>	<i>Timaeus</i>

Galenus

<i>De Placit.</i>	<i>De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis</i>
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Philo

<i>De Aet. Mundi</i>	<i>De Aeternitate Mundi</i>
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Proclus

<i>In Tim.</i>	<i>In Platonis Timaeum</i>
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Simplicius

<i>In DC</i>	<i>In libros Aristotelis De Caelo</i>
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Stobaeus

<i>Ecl.</i>	<i>Eclogae, Joannis Stobaei Anthologii libri, I-V (C. Wachsmuth/ O. Hense eds.), Berlin 1884-1912</i>
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Xenophon

<i>Mem.</i>	<i>Memorabilia</i>
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Cicero

<i>Div.</i>	<i>De Divinatione</i>
<i>Nat.D.</i>	<i>De Natura Deorum</i>
<i>Fin.</i>	<i>De Finibus</i>
<i>Leg.</i>	<i>De Legibus</i>
<i>Off.</i>	<i>De Officiis</i>
<i>Rep.</i>	<i>De Republica</i>
<i>Tusc.</i>	<i>Tusculanae Disputationes</i>

Seneca

<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Epistula</i>
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Journals

<i>AGPh</i>	<i>Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie</i>
<i>AJP/AJPh</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>Cl.Phil.</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>Class.&Med./C&M</i>	<i>Classica et Mediaevalia</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>Journ.Royal Stat. Soc.</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Statistical Society</i>
<i>OSAP</i>	<i>Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy</i>
<i>PASS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,</i> <i>Suppl. vol.</i>
<i>PCPhS</i>	<i>Proceedings of Cambridge Philological</i> <i>Society</i>
<i>Phron</i>	<i>Phronesis</i>
<i>PQ</i>	<i>Philosophical Quarterly</i>
<i>PR</i>	<i>Philosophical Review</i>
<i>Rev Met</i>	<i>Review of Metaphysics</i>
<i>Rh M</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum</i>

Books

- DK* H. Diels-W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker I-III*, Zürich 1966¹²
- FMM* Erik Nis Ostenfeld, *Forms, Matter and Mind. Three Strands in Plato's Metaphysics*, The Hague 1982
- RE* Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Real-Encyclopaedie d. klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* (1893-)
- SVF* Hans von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (1903-)

INTRODUCTION

The present volume contains a selection of papers on ancient philosophy presented in various settings, mostly published elsewhere, but some not published before. Chronologically they span from 1968 to the present day. Included are articles that have been collected from a variety of sources: journals, conference proceedings, a Festschrift, monographs and a scientific series. The majority of these articles are difficult to locate in their original publications, so the present book is designed to facilitate their access. But, perhaps more importantly, it is designed to bring together thematically complementary articles that form a united body of research and provide a deeper insight into the topics discussed. The contributions fall roughly into three main groups: Socrates, Plato and later philosophy (including Aristotle and the Stoics), all of which reflect the author's lifelong interest and which may have something to offer to the ongoing debate. The collection is headed by an article focusing on the ontology of an earlier period (the Pythagoreans) with some repercussions in later thought and of general philosophical interest.

The papers on Socrates focus a good deal on the formal aspect of Socratic philosophy, Socratic methodology and its outcome: truth or the preparation for truth. Two papers deal with more substantial topics such as the foundation of morality and a central Socratic paradox.

The papers on Plato fall into four groups. One cluster discusses themes relating to the *Republic*: the Good and social justice, psychotherapy, happiness (*eudaimonia*) and mental health. Another cluster of three papers deals with the influential *Timaeus* from various viewpoints: the Forms, matter and motion. Then follow three papers that share the view that soul is necessarily embodied: self-motion in the *Phaedrus*, God in the *Politicus* and the psychology of the *Philebus*, plus a piece on self-control in the *Laws*. The Plato part ends with two papers on Plato's development and his late philosophy in the light of the *Epinomis* (which is argued to be genuine) and a tailpiece on the formal and much debated subject of how to read Plato in 'Who speaks for Plato?'

Part III consists of two papers on post-Platonic philosophy: Aristotle on the good life and the transformation of Stoicism by Panaetius and Posidonius.

Prelude: A first approximation to the abstract

Early Pythagorean Principles: Peras and Apeiron

It is commonly assumed that the Pythagoreans, the Italian school of philosophy, advocated and introduced a philosophy of form or structure in contrast to earlier Ionian philosophy of matter. Such form-matter opposition presumably reflects a distinction similar to that suggested by the Aristotelian form/matter distinction. Judging from the best extant evidence, Aristotle's report in *Metaphysics A*, it appears that (a) the Pythagoreans are regarded as *different* from the *phusiologoi* owing to their use of stranger elements: non-sensible, immovable, mathematical objects. However, (b) they *agree* with the physical philosophers that the real is simply all that is perceptible. So Plato complains that the Pythagoreans are too empirical (*Rep.* 531c).

So how are these Pythagorean principles to be conceived? One might think that being the *elements of number* they would be fairly abstract entities. However, numbers, being identical with things themselves, are *not* abstract; and looking through his own spectacles of form/matter, Aristotle concludes that the different Pythagorean principles seem to have been ranged under the head of *matter*: 'for out of these as immanent parts they say substance is composed and moulded'. However, in contrast to the earlier materialists the two principles of finitude (*peperasmenon*) and unlimited are not certain other natures (*phuseis*) like fire, earth, etc., but are themselves the substance (*ousia*) of the things of which they (sc. the one (or finitude) and unlimited) are predicated (*Met.*987a15-19). The following conclusion can be drawn: we are dealing not with a form/matter dualism in the Aristotelian sense, but with something far more primitive: the primeval unit (with magnitude) breathes and imposes order on the unlimited. But also something 'modern': *Pythagorean opposites are of another, wider and more abstract order than Ionian opposites*, and they are notably value-laden. Hence, when Aristotle seems to think, uneasily, that we are still within the confines of materiality, he is not quite right. And when he mentions unlimited only as matter, he may be interpreting the Pythagoreans in Platonic terms.

More precisely, Pythagorean numbers may have been conceived of as *extended (with magnitude) but without corporeality*: matter and geometrical structure coincide, in spite of Aristotle's protests. Cf. Melissos' One which is extended (frg.3) but without body (frg.9), Plato's elementary geometrical configurations in space, Descartes' matter which is extension only, and in modern times, perhaps, Einstein's and Heisenberg's notion of fields in space. Aristotle cannot accept the notion of an extended but incorporeal self-subsistent substance. This accounts for his unsuccessful

attempts to fit the Pythagoreans into his own metaphysical framework. Is it then a philosophy of form we have been considering, or is it rather one of matter? The answer is that the question is anachronistic. Put in Aristotelian terms, it is both too modern (later in time) and too primitive. Recent developments in physics appear to have transcended the Aristotelian dichotomy, and physicists are now concerned with a mathematical conception of reality that might have raised the interest or even enthusiasm of the ancient Pythagoreans.

Part I: Socrates

Method

One way to get an idea of what Socrates was up to by way of method is to take a look at Aristotle's manuals of dialectic and then turn to the early dialogues of Plato to identify the strategy of Socratic conversation. This procedure helps one to spot the sophistic Socrates in particular. Hence it is tempting to see him (with Aristotle) as merely refuting people, not offering any truths himself. However, on the basis of a full registration of the arguments to be found in the early dialogues, the following more nuanced results have been reached:

(A) We have found that G. Vlastos must be corrected on several important points and that R. Robinson was much more right than his later critics have realised: Firstly, a closer and more systematic examination of the dialogues confirms that the overwhelming amount of refutation is *indirect* (more than twice the number of direct refutations, 50:21). Hence, Vlastos' critique that Robinson's indirect *elenchus* is 'not in the texts' is unwarranted. Secondly, it is notable that indirect refutation is used mainly to refute *definitions of moral terms*, whereas direct refutation focuses largely on *other positive moral theses* (e.g., 'listen to experts in morals', 'the deliberately criminal is the only good person', 'it is worse to do wrong', 'correction is better than licence', 'the beautiful is identical with the good'). However, there is no warrant for claiming that Socrates does not occasionally use indirect argument too for *establishing* moral theses ('justice is holiness', 'temperance is wisdom', 'might is not right', 'a life of pleasure is not attractive and not the good'). This relates to the question of Socrates' commitment to the arguments and the minor premises. So thirdly, contrary to what Vlastos thinks, there is a clear dependence on *endoxa* in *direct* refutation and in what I call 'Extended *Reductio*'. Vlastos claims that the *indirect* arguments rely on external premises, whereas our analyses show that of 45 indirect refutations 34 are conducted without such support

(‘Basic *Reductio*’). Fourthly, we have noted a methodological development from *hypothesis* in *elenchus* to *elenchus* in *hypothesis*.¹

(B) We have also countered the prevalent rather despairing attitude as to finding a consistent method in Socrates’ argumentation with a demonstration that we have at least *four logically distinct patterns* in the texts that deserve the title *elenchus*. Hence what has been offered is an empirically more well-founded picture of Socrates’ procedure in his conversations. At the same time, this is a defence of R. Robinson against the still dominant influence of G. Vlastos as well as being a counter-argument against the recent scepticism of, e.g., Brickhouse/Smith.

1. Socratic argumentation strategies and Aristotle’s *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*

The object of this essay is an examination of the Socratic elenctic method as it is practised in the so-called aporetic dialogues, that is, *Hippias Major*, *Hippias Minor*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*, *Republic I* and *Protagoras* and, with certain reservations, *Gorgias*, *Euthydemus* and *Meno*. The *Apology* and the *Crito* are relevant too. Apart from the Platonic evidence we get valuable information about dialogic projects in the orators, fragments and *testimonia* of sophists, the double speeches of Thucydides, Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, Isocrates’ *Against the Sophists* and *Helena* and Aristotle’s *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*.

A number of questions are raised: What is a Socratic *elenchus*? A rational and valid persuasion, a method of education, or a method of investigation? Was there more than one type of *elenchus*? What did it consist of? What was an *aporia*? What was the historical background of the *elenchus*? What was its potential? Could it provide knowledge or truth, or just prove something? What was the relation to other philosophical methods such as hypothetical method or dialectic? What kind of rationality is involved? Is reason really autonomous in the *elenchus* (going wherever the *logos* leads us)? How far is it a matter of rhetorical tricks? Who benefited from the *elenchus*? Did Socrates ever doubt his own method? Did Plato?

The strategy will be to discuss the form and function of the *elenchus* by looking first (heuristically) at the Aristotelian handbooks of dialectic to get an idea of what to look for with profit in the Socratic dialogues, and then to look at these dialogues themselves, with an occasional glance at other sources. It is of course always methodologically suspect to ‘read backwards’, i.e., to impute later insight to an earlier author. However, I

¹ The technical terms are explained in ch. 3 below, the most thorough study of the *elenchus*.

hope to have guarded against this by describing and intending the reading of Aristotle as 'heuristic'. The findings must be judged on their own.

An important by-product of the examination is to seek to isolate a double picture of a true historical Socrates and a heroic Platonic Socrates in the early dialogues. Socrates is depicted by Plato both as *different* from the sophists in both method and aim, and *also* as sophistic and even as a sophist (this is certainly how he is looked at by some of those who got in contact with him).

One can find the sophistic Socrates especially in *Hippias Minor*, *Charmides* and *Republic I*, while the heroic Socrates is most conspicuous in the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Euthydemus*, *Gorgias* and the *Meno*. Traditionally, most or all of the emphasis has been laid on the heroic Socrates. The aim of this essay is to redress the balance by focusing on another Socrates evident in his actual behaviour and the reactions it evoked in the dialogues.

2. Direct and indirect argumentation in the Socratic elenchus

Since Richard Robinson's studies on Socratic dialectic half a century ago, it has been realised that Socrates uses *two forms of refutation, direct and indirect*. Robinson counted the *elenchi* of the early dialogues (unfortunately without giving the references) and found that 2/3 of the *elenchi* were indirect. In that light, it was surprising that Vlastos focused on direct *elenchus* as the 'standard *elenchus*'. His reason was that indirect *elenchus* could only show inconsistency, not prove truth. But this seems incorrect and assumes that Socrates' first aim was to prove truth (which is debatable as a general claim). A consequence of this assumption was that Vlastos was unnecessarily, and I would argue wrongly, against identifying the additional premises of the *elenchus* as reputable beliefs. He was afraid of Socratic ethics being grounded on common moral notions.

I argue here that this fear is ungrounded. Apart from the special case of the *Gorgias*, there is no *direct* proof of truth, only of falsity in the *elenchus*, even in the direct *elenchus*. The *elenchus* is basically refutation of a person out of his own mouth, by Socrates. Hence the premises of that refutation are part of the belief system of the interrogated person, not of the interrogator. So we do not need to inquire whether Socrates happened to believe in all or some of the external or additional premises (i.e., other than the refutandum) of his various *elenchi*. In fact, he may or may not accept such premises, but it is not relevant whether he does. What *is* relevant is that these *external* premises are more fundamental (to the interlocutor) than the refutandum and are therefore preferred to the refutandum when inconsistency appears. An examination of these premises reveals that they extend from truisms *via* generally believed moral propositions (e.g. *sophrosune* is fine and good) and metaphysical principles (e.g. of function,

capacity, etc.) to sometimes trivial empirical truths. Most of them seem to have the status of Aristotelian *endoxa* that commend themselves to all or to the majority or to the wise (cf. *Top.* 100b22ff.) i.e., self-evident propositions, or insights of various groups of people. But even with a self-evident premise no proof is forthcoming.

In addition, direct and indirect *elenchi* do not reveal any significant difference as regards the choice of such premises. A consequence is that the much discussed ‘puzzle of the *elenchus*’ (i.e. how can Socrates think he gets *truth* when all he can claim is consistency?) seems illusory. I’m not arguing of course that Socrates is not interested in truth at the end. It is just *not the direct result of the individual elenchus*.

In the second part of my contribution I show that it is misleading to baptize one of the two forms of *elenchus* as ‘standard’. There seems to be no significant difference in their importance and use. Thus it is not the case that the indirect *elenchus* is used just as a kind of preliminary treatment to ‘rough up’ the interlocutor.

3. Socrates’ argumentative strategy

The literature on Socratic argumentation has been dominated by generalisations about the strategy of a Socratic conversation (Robinson and Vlastos have led the way, in different directions) or, at the other extreme, recently by total despair with regard to finding a unitary pattern (Polansky, Brickhouse and Smith). In this essay an attempt is made to give a more well-founded picture of Socratic argumentation than I believe has been offered so far. This is done by a systematic examination of the arguments found in the so-called early dialogues. Briefly the results demonstrate that (1) the overwhelming amount of refutation is *indirect* (R. Robinson was right and Vlastos wrong); (2) indirect refutation is mainly used to refute *definitions* of moral terms, whereas direct refutation is used on other (positive) moral theses. This does not preclude indirect refutation too from being occasionally used for *indirectly* establishing important moral theses; (3) more than half of the indirect refutations are conducted *without* the support of external premises (‘basic *reductio*’); (4) there is a reliance on *endoxa* in both direct and indirect refutation (‘extended *reductio*’); (5) there is a methodological development from *hypothesis* in *elenchus* to *elenchus* in *hypothesis*; and (6) we find *four distinct patterns* of elenctic argument in the texts, three indirect and one direct. Hence a defence is presented of Robinson against the influential Vlastos and also a counter-argument against the recent scepticism of, e.g., Brickhouse/Smith.

It may seem that the view of the *elenchus* in this chapter and in chapter 4 below is incompatible with the rather deconstructive view offered in chapters 1 and 2 above. However, this depends to some extent on *differ-*

ence in focus: in chapters 1 and 2 the focus is very much on the missing validity of the arguments of the sophistic Socrates and the direct outcome of such arguments. In addition, focusing on arguments in, e.g., the *Gorgias* may give the impression of a more positive *elenchus*, reflecting a more constructive use of the *elenchus* there.

4. *The Socratic elenchus reconsidered – once more*

Here my aim is to reopen the debate about the fundamental issue of the identification of the *method* pursued by Socrates in the early dialogues, by which I shall understand the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, *Hippias Minor*, *Ion*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*, *Hippias Major*, *Lysis*, *Menexenus* and *Republic I*.

I do not deal more than necessary with related questions of what Socrates believes he establishes, how he thinks he establishes it and whether he is justified in so believing, i.e. the validity of his arguments. However, I do intend to add some considerations on the status of the premises and the scope or goal of the *elenchus*, thereby entering the much debated question of the possibly *constructive* function of the *elenchus*.

In recent work on Socratic method it has too often been assumed that just *one* method was to be found in the dialogues. However, there may well be not one method but several methods at work. Even the *elenchus* itself should not initially be taken as one single method. Hence we must beware of a tendency towards unwarranted oversimplification in talking of *the elenchus*. Finally, we should be prepared for the fact that distinctions *we* find in method were not recognised by Plato.

I look first at two milestones in the literature about Socratic dialectic, Richard Robinson and Gregory Vlastos, and then having evaluated their contributions turn to a renewed consideration of the texts, in the light of previous insights. This is done in two steps, first a glance at the wider strategy of the *elenchus*, then a closer look at some selected *elenchi*. Finally I look at the results of the *elenchus*.

Can we conclude that the *elenchus* is an instrument in the search for *truth*? In other words, that it has a constructive side to it? There is no doubt that the *elenchus* is a method of clarification of moral matters: it tests moral definitions and typically finds them wanting. However, direct *elenchus* can also be used constructively to ‘*prove*’ *moral truths* such as the surely Socratic theses that it is worse to commit injustice than to suffer it, that injustice is the greatest evil. So the direct refutations at any rate can lead to positive results. What about the indirect refutations? Can they contribute in any positive way to moral elucidation? Again the answer seems Yes. It is important and an advance in knowledge to realise that pleasure and the good are not identical, that *sophrosune* is not just quiet,

that courage is not just endurance, etc. This ‘negative knowledge’ is of course less definite than the positive knowledge just mentioned, but its value is increased as the number of negations increases.

To summarise: I argue that Robinson and Vlastos both have their strengths and weaknesses and that a correct model of the *elenchus* should take seriously its *double nature*. Next, I emphasise the *prevalence of indirect refutation* and show the distribution *among* the dialogues and *in* some dialogues of the use of the two types of refutation. Third, I offer a model of the indirect refutation as a *reductio* that combines elements from both Robinson and Vlastos and an understanding of the external or *additional premises* of refutation that allows us to interpret them as common opinions and still as Socratic. Finally, I offer some reason for thinking that the outcome of all types of *elenchus* may on occasion be constructive and thus a way to achieve insight.

5. Hypothetical method in the Charmides

The strategy of the *Charmides* is to advance painstakingly from definitions of morality as ‘quietness’ and ‘modesty’ *via* ‘doing one’s own things’ and ‘doing good things’ to ‘knowing oneself’ and ‘knowledge of knowledge and oneself’. This procedure involves not only the usual analogies of various (sometimes dubious) qualities, established by induction, and other sophistic manoeuvres, but also so-called *hypotheses*. Not only *hypotheses* in the sense of suggested definitions, but also in the *Meno* sense, i.e., of provisional assumptions from which one can answer difficult questions. Thus in the *Charmides* the difficult question of whether morality understood as science of science will be of any use is answered on the assumption that it is possible (169d, 171d and 172c). At the end of the dialogue and after exploring the consequences of that *hypothesis*, Socrates evaluates the procedure, criticising (1) the *hypothesis* itself and also (2) an explication of it, i.e., that such a science knows the tasks of other sciences: they do ‘not follow from our *logos*’ (175b5).

I argue that this is a case of hypothetical method comparable to what goes on in *Meno* 86eff and *Phaedo* 100aff.: (1) we need an assumption about the possibility (or existence or nature) of *x* in order to deal adequately with a question about a quality of *x*, (2) we must accept only what follows from (or agrees with) the *hypothesis*, (3) there is a need for deriving the *hypothesis* itself from the *logos* (or a higher *hypothesis*), and (4) the consequences of the *hypothesis* may lead to its rejection.

In the second part of the paper I explore the possibility of finding a coherent and perhaps unified view of *hypothesis* in the dialogue. We have other acknowledged (by Socrates) occurrences of *hypothesis* in the dialogue, notably the *endoxon* that ‘*sophrosune* is fine’ (162d2) and the third

definition of *sophrosune*: ‘minding one’s own’ (163a7). Such uses are instantiated in other early dialogues.

Thus in the *Euthyphro* 9d8 the definition of the pious as ‘what all the gods love’ is introduced as a *hypothesis*, and at 11b6ff. Euthyphro complains that all proposals (i.e. definitions), which Socrates calls ‘your *hypotheses*’ (c5), run away, like statues of Daedalus, as Socrates implies. And he helps Euthyphro by suggesting a higher *hypothesis* from which the next definition can evolve. This situation is echoed in part *verbatim* in the *Meno* 97d6ff., where Meno too is in an *aporia* because his *hypothesis* (‘virtue is knowledge’ 89d) is running away because it is not tied down with an argument (*logismos*).

The procedure of the *Charmides* with its string of definitions displays an increase of insight as still higher *hypotheses* are tried out. Xenophon tells us that Socrates used to refer the argument back to *hypotheses*, thus making ‘truth’ apparent to his opponents too (*Mem.* IV. 6.13-15). I conclude that (1) the occurrences of *hypothesis* in the *Charmides* are not too different to be of one type, and (2) the hypothetical method found in the *Meno* and the *Phaedo* (without ontological implications) has significant parallels in the *Charmides*.

Morality

The fundamental question for Socrates is relating virtue to happiness and moral badness to unhappiness. Is virtue an extrinsic good, a mere instrument to use in obtaining happiness? Or is it an intrinsic good, either identical with happiness or a (the most important) constituent of happiness (still a necessary and sufficient condition of happiness)? Or is virtue not at all a sufficient condition, but only a necessary condition, conducive to happiness? The answer is that virtue is a necessary and sufficient condition of happiness and that conversely immorality is a necessary and sufficient condition of being unhappy. As a consequence, treating other people badly is sure to make you unhappy because it is not in your deepest interest. *Morality then is enlightened self-interest*. But the egocentricity is softened by the realisation that the good of the individual coincides with the good of society.

The paradox that ‘wrongdoing is involuntary’ is to be understood in this context of self-interest. We do not want to do harmful things (all individuals pursue good things for themselves), but (importantly) among harmful things are morally bad things, hence we do not want to do immoral things.

6. The foundation of Socratic morality

Bernard Williams has put the question that ‘we must ask why, if bodily hurt is no real harm, bodily hurt is what virtue so strongly requires one not to inflict on others?’ This raises the question of whether Socrates is in fact condemning specifically physical hurt. I suggest two answers on Socrates’ behalf: because the **victim’s** body and then his soul is harmed and that cannot be done by a good man, and because the **agent’s** own soul is destroyed by unhappiness. Hence I suggest a model that may be helpful in understanding the *workings of injustice* (immorality) according to Socrates. Secondly, I discuss, first, (a) the implications and interrelations of the terms *adikein* and *blaptein*, and next (b) the self-destruction and degrees of *unhappiness* consequent upon unjust behaviour. By this I hope to cast some light on the foundation of Socrates’ moral philosophy.

How more precisely is virtue then related to happiness (and badness to unhappiness)? Is virtue an extrinsic good, a mere instrument to use in obtaining happiness? Or is it an intrinsic good, either identical with happiness or a (the most important) constituent of happiness (still a necessary and sufficient condition of happiness)? Or is virtue not at all a sufficient condition, but only a necessary condition, conducive to happiness?

The *Charmides* is informative here. Thus temperance is most beautiful and therefore useful and a great good, the possession of which means happiness (175e). To live with knowledge of good and evil makes (*poieî*) one live well (*eû práttein*) and be happy. These references seem to indicate a causal and instrumental relation between morality and happiness. We have evidence from, e.g., the *Gorgias* (507b8-c7), where it is made clear that the virtuous is necessarily happy and the vicious necessarily unhappy. Hence to be virtuous is a sufficient and necessary condition for being happy. The fact that it is a sufficient condition is also confirmed, if we understand the implication of Socrates’ message that virtue does not come from possessions, etc., but from virtue come possessions and the other goods (*Ap.* 30b2-4). Obviously, to become good and wise is the greatest good for man (cf. *Ap.* 38a) and is necessary to deriving any benefit from ordinary goods. So virtue is logically both a necessary and a sufficient condition for being happy. Hence being immoral is certain to make you unhappy and thus Socrates was right to warn against being unjust: it is worse for the agent.

It may be asked how injuring other people could be avoided, if one has to do one’s duty as a citizen of Athens, participating in its wars and serving as a juror, penalising people for their offences. The answer here must be that the penalty must be just, and serving as a juror is just behaviour (though Socrates says that it is not his top priority: killing justly is neither

pitiable nor enviable). We may assume that he would take a similar stand on wars he had to fight on behalf of his city-state.

By way of conclusion, we can say that morality as such (the good) demands that one does not in any way injure any other person. That is, you *cannot* possibly be morally good in any acceptable sense and still treat someone else badly. This is how Socrates understands morality. But why then *be* moral? Because *self-interest* (my good and my happiness) requires that I do not in any way injure any other person. The foundation of Socratic morality is then in the first instance enlightened self-interest: to be good is *my deepest interest*. However, it is recognised that behind my deepest and most real interest lies the Good which is common to all and thus the reason why my interest does not conflict with but rather coincides with the interests of other people.

7. The meaning, implications and justification of a paradox: wrongdoing is involuntary (the refutation of Polus)

Answers are sought to two main questions: (1) The controversial issue of how Socrates (Plato) thinks, or how, in fact, the paradox that ‘wrongdoing is involuntary’ is *derived*, if at all, in the *Gorgias*. For instance, is the paradox derived solely from the ‘power argument’ (*G.* 466b-468e), or is it perhaps not derived at all from such an argument? Are other theses or perhaps paradoxes involved? (2) Is the paradox seen as or in fact *established*? To answer these questions we need to probe deeper: (3) What role is played by the argument against the power of orators, and by its thesis that all men desire the good? (4) What role, if any, is played by other Socratic paradoxes, e.g., Virtue is Knowledge, Wrongdoing is Worse than Suffering? And still more fundamentally, (5) what is the desire and knowledge involved in virtue and by implication in vice and wrong-doing?

I suspect that I offer what is in some respects a new analysis of the power argument (*Gorgias* 466b-468e) that gives us a sound and valid argument for the *possibility* of lack of power and desire satisfaction in orators and tyrants. I stress the hypothetical nature of the conclusion, because it is less counterintuitive than the traditional understanding of the text. An important sub-conclusion of the proof is the paradoxical thesis that ‘no one does *harmful things* voluntarily’ (468a-c). An important premise is that ‘all men have a desire for their own good’, ‘good’ here meaning ‘useful for the agent’, and that ‘all human action is motivated by this desire’ (a paradox): all desire is ‘good-dependent’ and desire is coupled with real (not apparent) good.

The other necessary ingredient in virtue, apart from desire, is power and expertise. As could be expected, the power argument has an important implication here: power is an ability to do as you want, i.e. achieve

your own good. Hence power is *good for you*. Expertise (*techne*) seems to be used much in the same sense. This power/expertise/knowledge that is virtue (a paradox) is implied in the power argument to be knowledge of one's own good. When added to or informing our natural desire for our good, we get not exactly virtue but success.

However, I derive the *moral* paradox that 'no one does wrong voluntarily' *from the other two paradoxes*: that 'all men seek what in fact and truly benefits them' and, importantly, that 'justice benefits them (and injustice is harmful)'. No more premises are needed.

Part II: Plato

The Republic

To Plato in the *Republic*, health is generally self-control and illness is immoral. So health is basically mental. He reverses the old adage *mens sana in corpore sano* to *corpus sanum in mente sana*. Temperance produces bodily well-being or at any rate makes the best of it. And temperance is a state of mental harmony and balance. This is health and happiness.

If the individual good life is mental health, what is then its relation to the social order? And *vice versa*, how is social order related to individual happiness? In other words, does the individual thrive in a well-ordered state, and is that state dependent on thriving individuals? In Plato's view individual and state ought to be truly integrated, which implies a true integration of individual and social justice.

Individual justice (morality), however, means different things in the different classes of the ideal state: only the ruling philosophers have full knowledge of the Good and are fully happy. But they are consequently capable of organising society in a way that transmits some opinion and guidelines to the lower classes, thus granting them some part in morality (courage and temperance respectively) and happiness.

Mental health/illness is, however, differently conceived in different parts of the Corpus. In the early aporetic dialogues mental illness is a matter of ignorance. Later in the *Republic* it is seen as an imbalance (to be treated with education including gymnastic and music), while the late-Platonic view is that mental derangement is psycho-somatic (treated with social conditioning and medication).

1. The place and justification of social justice in the good life in Plato's Republic – Or: Why does the philosopher return into the Cave?

This paper addresses not a general question about social or political justice, but the more specific one about its relation to the good life. This re-

quires that a number of other questions be answered: What (briefly) is social justice? What is private justice? How is social justice related to private justice? Has the problem of how to live best any connection with how society is best organised? Is man in general or the philosopher in particular, for Plato, a political animal? Are the happiness, pleasure and goodness of our lives (all of us or some of us) dependent on the social order? And if so, in what ways? The paper outlines three stages of justice found in the *Republic*: mental health – the Good – social order, in that order, and analyses their interrelations. This suggests answers to pressing questions about the status of the individual in contrast to the state and the rights of others.

The paper falls into two main parts, dealing with the Good and social order and their importance for the individual life. By way of introduction I briefly refer to the fact that individual justice in the *Republic* is mental health, the analogue of social justice as harmony of the classes. Then I look first at the point of the Good for individual life and mental health. Next, having examined in a transitional section the conception of reason to see whether philosophy and politics can be pursued by a unitary reason, I turn to the place and justification of social order for the individual good life (mental health, pleasure and welfare) and, briefly, the related question of the importance of mental health and individual good life for social order, thus ending by considering the question whether individual and social justice are truly integrated.

2. *The psychotherapeutic approach to healing in Plato (the Republic)*

In the *Republic* Plato tends to treat the ill as immoral, in need of education, and sees health as self-control or virtue (444d). He in fact reverses the old dictum *mens sana in corpore sano* to *corpus sanum in mente sana* (403d). This implies not only that intemperance produces bodily disease, but also that temperance produces bodily welfare, or at least makes the best of it (not a sufficient cause of bodily health). The idea is broached already and very emphatically in the *Charmides* 156b-157c, with a consciousness of its novelty. The concepts of health and disease in the *Republic* are influenced by Alcmaeon's model of *isonomia*: disease, bodily or mental, is a state of imbalance and conflict. Correspondingly, health, bodily or mental, is a state of balance and harmony. *Republic* books viii and ix (until 576) offer a whole spectrum of pathological societies and individuals. These are the patients of the Platonic doctor, i.e., the Platonic philosopher. It is, in fact, a study of the health and happiness (or better: welfare) or lack of them in various degrees (544a). By this means we are supposed to get a clearer perspective on what constitutes health and happiness in the healthy individual.

Problems raised and solutions proposed: (1) Is the mind-body relation asymmetrical? What view of man lies behind? (2) Does ultimate health require knowledge of Forms? In that case it would only be obtainable by a few. (3) For Plato health and disease are dependent on the policies of the state: its programme of education and its whole organisation and *ethos*. Hence, reform in health care implies reform of society. Do Plato's doubts about the realisability of his ideal state show in his hopes or otherwise for creating a healthy individual? Or is it enough to ground the state in one's soul? (4) Finally, the unfailing sign of health would presumably be the 'happiness' (*eudaimonia*) of the individual. If so, why? Moreover, how happy/healthy would the inhabitants of the state be? Can all (classes) expect happiness/health in the same degree? How can we decide? These questions may be asked even when the state is only realised personally.

3. *Eudaimonia* in Plato's Republic

The main motivation behind the *Republic*, it may be argued, is to create a happy community and to demonstrate that justice or morality (*dikaio-sune*) leads to or is *eudaimonia* of the city. Hence, we must first sharpen our conceptual tools and look at the notion of *eudaimonia*. What did it mean to the Greeks and Plato, and how do we translate it? The answer is that *eudaimonia* generally connoted 'material success', 'thriving' and so on. For Plato, however, the term embraced spiritual well-being, happiness. In view of the fact that Plato's ideal state is a class society, it seems relevant when considering the happiness of the state to take a look at the happiness of the guardians, the auxiliaries (soldiers and police) and the working class (artisans) in turn. Now the message of the *Republic* is that happiness involves being moral, just. So the classes are happy to the extent they are just. But being just involves knowledge of the Good which is possessed fully only by the ruling class. The auxiliaries and notably the working class have to rely on the insight of the ruling philosophers. Hence they are by necessity less happy than their superiors, but still as happy as they could possibly be considering their mental equipment. The philosophers or the guardians are the only ones capable of producing happiness in everyone in the community (519e-20a). The happiness of the whole community just means the happiness of all the inhabitants, whereas the happiness of the individual is defined by its place within the community.

I end by discussing critically in what sense a city based on state control from birth to death can meaningfully be said to be *eudaimon*. To us freedom is paramount, but to Plato we are free only to the extent that we are just, and the justice (morality) of, e.g., the working class is guaranteed by the rulers.

4. *Mental Health in Socrates and Plato*

We see an important development in the notion of health: from moral knowledge (early dialogues) *via* mental order (middle dialogues) to psycho-physical harmony (late dialogues).

The Platonic dialogues give us a picture of *logos* in various forms as therapy of the mind. In the early dialogues the Socratic *elenchus* clears the soul of all ignorance (i.e., Socratic vice and illness) just as in the later dialogues the *elenchus* is the highest and principal *katharsis* (*Soph.* 229d-230d and *Laws* 720de, cf. *Phd.* 65b-67c.). Also, mental health is morality throughout, from beginning to end (*Crit.* 47d, *Rep.* 444de, *Soph.* 228e), and bodily health requires mental health (*Charm.* 156e f., *Rep.* 403d).

However, there is an interesting development in the Corpus, apparently dependent on a different view of the irrational and man in general: an increasing awareness of the ineradicable influence of the body (medicine). Thus, in the early dialogues education seems to be directed mainly, if not exclusively, to the intellect, the means being refutation. Knowledge is the necessary and sufficient condition for virtue, while *ignorance* is the necessary and sufficient condition for vice (*Prot.* 351b-357e). Although Socrates applies 'charms' and is an 'enchanter', his means are *kaloï logoi*, i.e., not irrational formulae, but rigorous argument (there are, admittedly, irrational aspects to this such as appeals to shame, repetition of arguments, etc., but basically his procedure is an appeal to reason). By contrast, in the middle dialogues (beginning already in the *Gorg.* 505bc and on), we find mental health (and morality) understood as balance (on the model of Alcmaeon's *isonomia*) and mental illness correspondingly as *imbalance and conflict* rather than ignorance, and an educational programme including gymnastics and music, both in the service of mental training and character development. The unhealthy constitutions and unhealthy personalities, e.g., the tyrant of the *Republic*, are not only unhealthy but also immoral, in need of education. Today the notion of the ill as immoral (health as control over the passions) would be regarded as a primitive and outdated. Eventually, Plato grows more pessimistic about the possibilities of mental, not to say intellectual, education, and resorts to rhetorical *psychagogia* (*Phdr.* 269d-272b) and even physical punishment in the end (*Laws*), in line with his nosology (*Tim.*). Thus, in the late dialogues we find the view of the immoral as also physically (not only mentally, as in the *Republic*) ill and the connected idea that diseases are psycho-somatic: *mania* and *amathia* are causally dependent on bodily states (*Tim.* and *Phil.*). Social conditioning and medication have now replaced teaching. This is a realization of the force of the body and the irrational, as well as being the predominant modern way of looking at the facts.

The Timaeus

In the *Timaeus* the Forms are patterns (*paradeigmata*) but no longer exclusive (*monoëide*). They are now seen as interrelated natural kinds and hence arguably no longer separate from the world. In this way they resemble what we find in other late dialogues. The two-world picture is not what we get: there is one world generated by Forms and Place. It seems possible to interpret the Forms as numerical ratios somehow implicated in matter, generating its actual structures. This is what may be termed ‘cosmic matter’, generated by imposition of the mentioned ratios on ‘pre-cosmic matter’ or chaos. The latter is made up of a place-matrix characterised by irregular solids. Having no definite character, it cannot even be viewed as extension, a term better reserved for cosmic matter which is also regarded as full (without void) and finite. There is a problem about the motion of chaos, as motion in the later dialogues has its source in the soul. Instead of positing an irrational soul as responsible (not warranted by the text), it may be suggested that irrational precosmic motion is due to an irrational part of the world soul. It then has to be assumed that creation is a paedagogical ploy.

5. The role and status of the Forms in the Timaeus: paradigmaticism revisited?

It is argued that the ontological-cosmological key-terms of the *Timaeus* relate to the late dialogues, and that the Forms, although viewed as *paradeigmata*, are not affected by the critique of the *Parmenides*. Forms are no longer exclusive, but are interrelated *natural kinds* and hence (arguably) not separate from the world, at least in the sense of constituting another world: there is only this one world ‘generated’ by Forms and Space. But we may approach this one world either by thought or by the senses. Moreover, these Forms may be interpreted as sets of numerical ratios somehow implicated in matter (i.e., as not entirely abstract), mirrored by actual structures in space. For instance, this dog here instantiates to our senses (mirrors) temporarily a unique intelligible paradigmatic set of numerical ratios. Plato seems to be experimenting with the Forms in this late dialogue.

6. Plato’s concept of matter

Plato’s conception of matter may be summarised as follows: (a) there is an underlying *place-matrix*, existing independently of what may characterise it. It is itself totally without any marks that might individuate it, but it supplies the place where diverse geometrical configurations appear. The figures that are found in the place-matrix in the precosmic state are *irregular solids*. These, when characterising the matrix, are transformed into physical entities or ‘powers’ that interact with their fellow powers in

a totally disorganised way. Such is ‘chaos’ or *Platonic matter*, that is, the materials that God or Divine mind takes over. It will be understood that it is a misconception to identify the *place-matrix* with extension. Extension is rather what we call ‘Platonic matter’, i.e., the product of the imposition of figures, of any kind, on the place-matrix. Moreover, the place-matrix is structured all over, no place is left empty: Plato does not believe in a void. It is also implied that structured place is finite. When cosmos is created no matter is left out. (b) *Cosmic matter* is precosmic matter arranged into four regular solids. These and their compounds and varieties are probably what the *Phaedo* and the *Parmenides* refer to by ‘the Forms in us’. They are not eternal, but may be broken down (*Phd.* 106 c). (c) As a third kind of matter we have *empirical matter*, i.e., tables, chairs, etc., as we experience them. This is a rather subjective form of matter that was adduced just for the sake of completeness.

The precise order of the individual dialogues is unknown. With one exception (the *Timaeus*), we have followed the chronology of W.D. Ross. There is not, however, much change in Plato’s *views* on matter. Rather there seems to be a shift in *scope*: from an idealistic obsession with perceptual matter in the middle dialogues (the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*), to a more realistic acknowledgement of physical matter in the later dialogues.

7. *Disorderly motion in the Timaeus*

The problem is this: in the *Phaedrus* (245), in his argument for the immortality of the soul, Plato had argued that the soul is ever in motion, a self-mover and first principle of motion for all other things. Again in the *Laws* (896) we find a similar doctrine when the essence of soul is defined as self-movement and the source of all movement. In other words, this is seemingly a well-established doctrine in the second part of the Platonic Corpus. Now the *Timaeus* offers an account of the coming into being of the world from a mixture and combination of necessity and intelligence. This is done by way of a description of a pre-cosmic chaos. If this is to be consistent with the doctrine outlined above of no-motion-without-soul, we are forced to assume a *second* and irrational world-soul as responsible for the pre-cosmic chaos. This escape, however, is not open as no such soul is mentioned in the *Timaeus*. Even not taking creation literary is no help. Perhaps, then, we ought to take the *circle of the Different to stand for the irrational element in the world-soul*. Plato has an account (37a-c) of the intellectual performances carried out by the circle of the Different: it is concerned with the sensible world and results in opinion and belief. In contrast to the circle of the Same concerned with the Forms and resulting in knowledge. Later on (51d), true belief is distinguished from knowledge by being irrational. With some qualifications, partly pointed out by Vlastos,

an analogy with the human soul can be drawn. It is to be noted in this connection that Plato lets his Demiurge form the immortal part (*reason*) of man from the ingredients left over from the creation of the *world-soul* (*sic*), but mixed slightly less well. Thus Plato allows for more irrationality in man in two ways: his *reason* 1) equals the world's *soul*, and 2) is badly mixed.

Psychology

The later dialogues offer a new conception of the soul as a self-mover and a *dunamis* or *kinesis*. It is argued that self-motion involves tripartition (or partition one way or another), and that tripartition (or some other partition) in turn involves embodiment. A case in point is God in the *Politicus* myth. His motion is arguably physical rotation, with a possible non-physical aspect. In the *Laws* self-motion is not seen as occurring by itself, but as accommodating itself to and exhibiting itself within physical processes, a purposive physical motion among mechanical motions. The later dialogues agree that mind requires soul, which requires embodiment. However, mind and soul are not two different things, but mind is soul in the original and best condition (self-rotation). Another case is the soul in the *Philebus*. It is viewed in an almost Aristotelian way as the dynamic structure of the body. It confirms the conception of soul as a mathematical entity most explicit in the *Timaeus*. It is reminiscent of the harmony soul of Simmias and the weaver soul of Cebes in the *Phaedo*. But Plato does not take this line. He adds his own idealist twist, purposive reason, to the picture.

The *Laws* differs from earlier dialogues in its interest in the management of irrational feelings by three means: conditioning (dance, rhythm, harmony and exposure to moral persons), self-integration (a more conscious training by exposure to intense emotions and dangers) and finally sublimation.

8. Self-motion, tripartition and embodiment

In the later dialogues the new conception of the soul as a self-mover coincides with its being characterised as a *dunamis* and *kinesis*, i.e., something that must be in something else. Hence self-motion seems to be (or at any rate to involve) bodily motion. Comparison of the tripartite soul of the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus* confirms that psychic partition has to do with embodiment, as in the *Republic*. However, in contrast to the *Republic* the soul is *tripartite by constitution* in the *Phaedrus*: it is necessarily embodied. Self-motion requires tripartition, i.e., unsatisfiable bodily desire regulated by reason, supported by aggression, and tripartition in turn involves embodiment. Hence *self-motion involves embodiment*.

9. *The physicality of God in the Politicus myth and in the later dialogues*

In this paper I argue that God in Plato's later dialogues, especially the *Politicus*, is necessarily immanent and that God's motion is physical motion, without thereby precluding the possibility that he may have a non-physical aspect. Hence, to avoid misunderstanding, I am not about to argue for the position (unlikely in Plato's case) of physicalistic reductionism. If his position must have a name, I suggest a kind of *soft physicalism*, not unlike the Aristotelian concept of enmattered forms (Aristotle's theology is another matter).

It is commonly thought that self-motion is psychic (non-physical). If this is correct, it would threaten the picture offered here of the physicality of not only world-soul but also world-reason. However, in *Laws X* we get a fairly accurate account of self-motion in the classification of the ten possible motions (893b ff). Self-motion is here defined as what is permanently capable of moving both itself and other things in (κατά) or finding its place in (ἐναρμόττουσαν), all active and passive processes (894bc). If Plato felt that he transgressed categorial boundaries and thought of or had at the back of his mind the possibility of special *psychic* motions, then we are not told so. On the contrary, self-motion is pictured not as occurring by itself, but as 'accommodating itself to and exhibiting itself within' physical processes. The plain reading of this text suggests that of physical motions some are transmitted, some are self-moving. This is a distinction between mechanical and purposive physical motion. The latter is the soul's own motion, but we should avoid thinking of it as non-physical. Following the logic rather than the surface meaning has led to the idea of a god (at least) tied to the physical (he must be immanent, but could be allowed a non-physical side). This reading was supported by texts from a series of dialogues belonging to the same period (*Soph.*, *Phil.*, *Tim.*, *Laws*). They all agree that nothing can have mind without soul, and that soul must be embodied. Plato was not, if this is correct, a theist, but rather a *pantheist*. Moreover, it has been argued that the two late-Platonic concepts, soul and reason, are not two different things. Rather the latter is soul in its best and original state (self-rotation). Hence Plato can both regard reason as requiring soul and as being basic in so far as it is never generated. Soul, on the other hand, can be said to be created, by reason. Where it is claimed to be ungenerated (*Phaedrus*), it is to be viewed as identical to reason (i.e., a reasonable soul). With this conceptual clarification we hope to have shown that as reason is soul (a kind of self-mover), and as soul in the later dialogues is necessarily embodied, it follows that reason in the late dialogues is necessarily embodied.

10. *The psychology of the Philebus*

The psychology of the *Philebus* is part of a general Platonic ontological framework, i.e., Forms, soul, reason, stuff, etc. This means that the concept of soul in the *Philebus* is likely to develop if the other ingredients of that ontology have developed. The thesis defended here is that Plato's view of the soul in the *Philebus* has become almost Aristotelian: it is viewed as the **dynamic structure of the body**. This fits in with a traditional conception of the four ontological ingredients: unlimited, limit, mixture and cause as precursors of the Aristotelian four causes. An organism is a right combination of stuff. On the face of it, we seem to be presented with a conception of soul as harmony of the body. The implication is that soul is always embodied. It may be objected that there are, e.g., special pains and pleasures belonging to the soul itself 'apart from' the body (32c4, 34c6). How can this be reconciled with a structure-soul intimately bound up with the body?

I have to do mainly two things: (1) defend an interpretation of a key passage in *Phil.* 32a9-b4 against the background of the metaphysics of the dialogue, and (2) counter possible objections to this interpretation.

The *Philebus* psychology is not unique but in line with other late dialogues such as *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Timaeus* and *Laws*. Moreover, it confirms a view of the soul as a mathematical entity most explicit in the *Timaeus*. The limit soul understood in the light of *Timaeus* as a mathematical harmony of the body is reminiscent of both Simmias' harmony soul and Cebes' weaver soul. However, it is important to notice that Plato does not subscribe to either of these conceptions as they stand but crucially supplies his own idealist twist: reason.

11. *Sophrosune in the Laws: cultivation of feeling by conditioning, self-control and sublimation*

It is argued here that the *Laws* differs from earlier dialogues in the belief that desire can to some extent be moulded or conditioned, controlled or sublimated. By 'desire' in this connection is meant 'basic physical desire' for material goods such as drink, food, sex and the objects that promote the acquisition of such things. The resulting virtuous state resulting from the various ways in which desire, pleasure and pain are dealt with is *sophrosune*. I focus on these different ways in turn.

In the *Laws* basic physical desires can from an early age be 'turned the right way'. *Paideia* is essential for full virtue to be achieved later and consists here in the discipline or *correct formation* of the feelings of pleasure and pain. Education is then the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred are *directed* in the right courses before it can understand the reason why. Later

when the child understands, its reason and emotions come to agree that it has been given the appropriate habits. Hence *sophrosune* develops into the full virtue which is the concord of reason and emotion (653b6), whereas education (the prerequisite) just is the correct formation of our feeling of pleasure and pain.

Another necessary condition of full *sophrosune* is self-control (*enkrateia*). But self-control is also to some extent necessary to courage which needs to fight not only external enemies but also emotions (633c8-e6). Self-control first becomes relevant when reason has developed. Hence children cannot exhibit self-control. They are at the mercy of their emotions and think they are right. Self-control is required because of a *bad* trait in our make-up which is in principle uneducable, thus leaving room for *akrateia*. Hence it is necessary to *bar* certain basic drives by fear, laws and force. What does this barring is the golden cord of reason, helped by educated aggression/shame and desire.

There may be a third way of dealing with desire when reason has developed: rechannelling or *sublimation* (783a). It consists in canalizing the ‘unhealthy instincts’ away from the supposed supreme pleasure toward the supreme good. Varieties hereof seem to be indulging in one, and ‘starvation’ of another element, i.e., of desire. However, it cannot be said that sublimation is to the fore in the *Laws* in the way it is in the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*.

In brief: In **conditioning** the impulse is *redirected* towards other, more proper objects, but not itself transformed. In **self-control** the bad impulse remains unaltered but is made *less effective*. Hence it differs from **sublimation** where the impulse is *transformed*.

We conclude that the *Laws* demonstrates a growing awareness and interest on Plato’s part in finding effective ways of dealing with the irrational emotions (especially desire), that there is a special focus on self-control and incontinence, and that the original contribution of the *Laws* is a rather sophisticated programme of conditioning, a kind of ‘persuasion’, in addition to compulsion and constraint.

Plato’s Development and How to Read Plato

It is somewhat trendy nowadays to deny or ignore that Plato develops. However, this is absurd in many ways, e.g. exegetically and psychologically to take the most obvious obstacles. There are too many contradictions in the Corpus that cannot simply be explained away as ‘dialectical’, and it is inconceivable and extraordinary that a long philosophical career does not exhibit some development. It is another matter of some difficulty to determine such development. Plato’s late philosophy is in focus for the present author. Thus it is firstly argued, in opposition to G. Owen, that

the *Timaeus* is late from the formal point of literary criticism, its view of *paradeigmata*, the physical world, mathematical interest and psychology. Secondly, the *Epinomis* is examined on a number of topics and found to be genuine. Its message is that wisdom is astronomy and its foundation, scientific arithmetic. In other words, as we already knew from Aristotle, Plato Pythagorised in his old days. He was impressed by the science of his time and inspired the scientists.

Plato's work is dialogical with many different characters apart from Socrates. But as Plato does not himself appear it becomes a problem: what are we to take as Plato's views? Who is the mouthpiece of Plato? I suggest somewhat provocatively that everybody, i.e. every character, is Plato's mouthpiece as he may be conceived as thinking aloud in his written dialogues. The dialogues are artistic wholes and the author's message must be dealt with and interpreted accordingly. Not unlike Sophocles' dramas. This is not to deny that there are recurrent points of view that thereby offer themselves as Platonic.

12. *Plato's development and the date of the Timaeus*

There seems still to be widespread support for the heresy propounded by Owen in his famous 1953 article that the *Timaeus* is a late middle dialogue, antedating the so-called critical dialogues (the *Parmenides*, the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, the *Politicus* and the *Philebus*). As this redating has deep repercussions in Platonic exegesis and is not only controversial but, in the present writer's opinion, untenable, it ought to be subjected to detailed criticism. Cherniss has done much to defend the traditional dating, but he has not convinced as many as one would like. Moreover, he does not deal with all of Owen's arguments. Hence, there is room for reopening the issue.

First, I deal with a formal aspect, that of literary criticism and its possible value for dating the dialogues. Next, *παράδειγματα* in the *Parmenides* and later dialogues are discussed. Third, the *γένεσις-οὐσία* antithesis is examined. Fourth, the mathematical character of the *Timaeus* is analysed and, finally, the psychology of the *Timaeus* is discussed and compared with that of other late dialogues.

The results are this: the *Timaeus* is late for a number of reasons. First, from a formal point of view, Socrates is not the speaker and the foreign speaker is prone to long monologue and to digression. Secondly, the *Timaeus* implies an advanced view of paradigms that is not reconcilable with the middle dialogues, not affected by the criticism of the *Parmenides*, and in line with the attempts at revision to be found in the late dialogues. Thirdly, the conception of the physical world (*γένεσις*) is much more positive than that of the middle dialogues and even the *Cratylus* and the